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Abstract
Since the state estimation algorithm has been firstly proposed, considerable research in-
terest has been shown in adapting and applying the different versions of this algorithm to
the power transmission systems. Those applications include power system state estimation
(PSSE) and short-term operational planning. In the transmission level, state estimation of-
fers various applications including, process monitoring and security monitoring. Recently,
distribution systems experience a much higher level of variability and complexity due to
the large increase in the penetration level of distributed energy resources (DER), such as
distributed generation (DG), demand-responsive loads, and storage devices. The first step,
for better situational awareness at the distribution level, is to adapt the most developed
real time state estimation algorithm to distribution systems, including distribution system
state estimation (DSSE). DSSE has an important role in the operation of the distribution
systems.
Motivated by the increasing need for robust and accurate real time state estimators,
capable of capturing the dynamics of system states and suitable for large-scale distribution
networks with a lack of sensors, this thesis introduces a three state estimators based on a
distributed approach. The first proposed estimator technique is the square root cubature
Kalman filter (SCKF), which is the improved version of cubature Kalman filter (CKF).
The second one is based on a combination of the particle filter (PF) and the SCKF, which
yields a square root cubature particle filter (SCPF). This technique employs a PF with
the proposal distribution provided by the SCKF. Additionally, a combination of PF and
CKF, which yields a cubature particle filter (CPF) is proposed. Unlike the other types of
filters, the PF is a non-Gaussian algorithm from which a true posterior distribution of the
estimated states can be obtained. This permits the replacement of real measurements with
pseudo-measurements and allows the calculation to be applied to large-scale networks with
a high degree of nonlinearity. This research also provides a comparison study between the
above mentioned algorithms and the latest algorithms available in the literature. To vali-
date their robustness and accuracy, the proposed methods were tested and verified using a
large range of customer loads with 50% uncertainty on a connected IEEE 123-bus system.
Next, a developed foretasted aided state estimator is proposed. The foretasted aided state
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estimator is needed to increase the immunization of the state estimator against the delay
and loss of the real measurements, due to the sensors malfunction or communication fail-
ure. Moreover, due to the lack of measurements in the electrical distribution system, the
pseudo-measurements are needed to insure the observability of the state estimator. There-
fore, the very short term load forecasting algorithm that insures the observability and
provides reliable backup data in case of sensor malfunction or communication failure is
proposed. The proposed very short term load forecasting is based on the wavelet recurrent
neural network (WRNN). The historical data used to train the RNN are decomposed into
low-frequency, low-high frequency and high frequency components. The neural networks
are trained using an extended Kalman filter (EKF) for the low frequency component and
using a square root cubature Kalman filter (SCKF) for both low-high frequency and high
frequency components. To estimate the system states, state estimation algorithm based
SCKF is used. The results demonstrate the theoretical and practical advantages of the
proposed methodology.
Finally, in recent years several cyber-attacks have been recorded against sensitive monitor-
ing systems. Among them is the automatic generation control (AGC) system, a fundamen-
tal control system used in all power networks to keep the network frequency at its desired
value and for maintaining tie line power exchanges at their scheduled values. Motivated
by the increasing need for robust and safe operation of AGCs, this thesis introduces an
attack resilient control scheme for the AGC system based on attack detection using real
time state estimation. The proposed approach requires redundancy of sensors available
at the transmission level in the power network and leverages recent results on attack de-
tection using mixed integer linear programming (MILP). The proposed algorithm detects
and identifies the sensors under attack in the presence of noise. The non-attacked sensors
are then averaged and made available to the feedback controller. No assumptions about
the nature of the attack signal are made. The proposed method is simulated using a large
range of attack signals and uncertain sensors measurements.
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The electric power industry worldwide has undergone significant changes over the last
decade. The rapidly growing demand for electric power relative to the available supply, the
environmental impact of conventional plants and the fears of the depletion of conventional
energy resources (oil and gas), have begun to push energy sources towards distributed
generations (DGs), such as wind and solar [35]. In the province of Ontario in Canada,
for example, the output power generated by these renewable energy resources will reach
10 GW by end of 2018 [108]. With the increased penetration of DGs into the distribu-
tion system, reliable system operation and control has become increasingly difficult as the
power flow no longer remains unidirectional. Moreover, the random variations in power
produced by weather-based generation cause different levels of uncertainty that affect a
variety of decisions. This stochastic nature of the sources may results in unpredictable
power flows, greater voltage fluctuations, and different network reactive power character-
istics [59]. Therefore, advanced real-time monitoring, and control are needed in order to
operate and control the system efficiently and to ensure high reliability and safety.
An accurate real time estimation of the distribution system states is the first step towards
real-time monitoring, proper system assessment, and efficient control actions. A distribu-
tion system state estimation (DSSE) is a systematic procedure for processing a set of real
and pseudo-measurements in order to estimate bus voltages and angles and, hence, the
current state of a system. State estimator is composed of two stages: prediction and filter-
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ing stage. The first stage predicts the system state before the measurements arrived and
the second one is to filter out the predicted values upon the receiving of the measurements.
Once the information from the state estimator are received, and with the knowledge of the
system components, the second step is to assess the situation of the distribution system
and to provide the operator with knowledge about the state of the system ahead of time
in order to take proper control actions.
As another type of application of the real time state estimation in the transmission level,
is the cyber security of the automatic generation control (AGC) system in either single-
area or multi-area AGC system. The AGC system is a fundamental control system used
in all power networks to keep the network frequency at its nominal value (50 or 60 Hz),
and maintaining tie-line power exchanges at their scheduled values. Several cyber-attack
incidents incidents in power networks appears in [114, 42]. Since the AGC is a sensitive
component in the power system and is vulnerable to the cyber attack, there is a need to
protect this valuable component from the cyber attacks.
1.1 Motivation
State estimation is an essential stage in the monitoring and assessment of electrical distri-
bution networks. In light of todays large-scale distribution systems characterized by limited
information coupled with a high degree of fluctuation and uncertainty related to generation
and demand, the development of an efficient DSSE has become a necessity. The literature
has reported two schemes for estimating the states of a distribution system: centralized
and decentralized. In centralized schemes, all measurement data must be sent to a central
unit for processing in order to obtain the estimated states. However, the determination of
the states over the whole distribution system has become challenging and difficult because
of the large size of todays systems, which are expected to expand even further with the
anticipated extensive proliferation of renewable energy sources (RESs) and electrical vehi-
cles (EVs). In the second, decentralized, type of scheme, the entire distribution system is
divided into a number of zones, each with its own estimator that coordinates with other
zone estimators. In view of the ongoing development of the smart grid, more research on
state estimator algorithms is needed to meet the challenges that smart grid functionalities
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present. Among others, environmental compliance, reliability, and security will impose ad-
ditional constraints on the state estimation and require improved performance in terms of
response time and robustness [28]. In order to meet these constraints, both the prediction
and the filtering stages need to be further improved. For the filter stage, most of the state
estimator algorithms available in the literature are based on the static approach, which
has been proved not compatible especially because of the load fluctuation. The rest of the
filtering stages are based on approximations that lead to inaccurate estimation. Moreover,
most of the existing state estimation algorithms are either based on the Kalman filter (KF)
or the weighted least square principle. Neither these two approaches are capable of coping
with the nonlinear dynamics of the distribution system, nor can they deal with the non-
Gaussian distribution of the pseudo-measurements. Therefore, proposing a state estimator
that can tackle these issues is crucial in order to accomplish the first step of comprehensive
monitoring of the distribution system. For the prediction stage, most of the algorithms are
based on the regression, or forecasting-based method. Moreover, to have a robust state es-
timator, not only the filtering algorithm needs to be improved but also the predictor needs
to be enhanced. In one hand, improvement of the prediction stage has a huge impact on
the accuracy of the state estimator, and on the other hand it can give the operator a quick
view about the situation in the distribution system. From the above, it seems that there
is a need for a robust real time state estimator that can cope with severe load fluctuations
and the huge uncertainty in the pseudo-measurements, loss/delay/ lack of measurements.
In recent years, several cyber-attack incidents have been reported [53]. A detailed sur-
vey of different cyber-attack incidents was provided in [102] and a detailed elaboration
on cyber-attack incidents in power networks appears in [114, 42]. Little work has been
conducted with respect to attack resilient measures that are used to detect, identify, and
mitigate corrupted real-time measurements in the feedback loop of AGC. The accuracy
and reliability of real-time measurements has a significant impact on system’s real-time
operation. In smart power grids, real-time measurements for AGC are transmitted us-
ing computer networks [104]. These computer networks might be an attractive space for
cyber-attackers, e.g., disgruntled employees, insiders, nation states or terrorist organiza-
tions [101]. Through the computer network, the attacker can also learn the parameters
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of the system using the algorithm shown in [104]. The compromised measurements may
lead to very severe and adverse effects on the management and control of a smart grid.
For example, the corrupted measurements can cause a rapid decline in the system fre-
quency that leads to trigger load shedding schemes or generators disconnecting. This is
because the compromised measurements can mislead the AGC, which requires minimal
supervision and intervention by human operators, to increase generation through a false
impression of increasing demand. The imbalance between power generation and demand
leads to deviation of the grid frequency from its nominal value. The channels through
which the attacker can corrupt sensor measurements include the physical sensors, sensor
data communication links, and data processing programs at the control center. Accessing
and attacking geographically distributed physical sensors is tedious and hard to coordinate.
However, hacking a computer program at the strongly protected control center is not im-
possible [53], [102]. From the above, it seems that there is a need for an algorithm based
real time state estimator for mitigation of cyber-physical attacks in multi-area automatic
generation control.
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Objective
The proposed research broadly aims at incorporating the concept of the intelligent distri-
bution system into operations and control. With an accurate and timely state estimation
result, we could monitor system performance, and diagnose malfunctions in both the mon-
itoring system and the grid. Therefore, the state estimator plays an important role in
reliable and secure intelligent distribution system operations. The proposed state estima-
tor may operate under a lack of measurements due to communication failures or delays.
Moreover, due to the limited number of measurements, the proposed estimator should deal
with high uncertainty and in all above circumstances should provide accurate informa-
tion about the distribution system states. During operations under any configuration, the
objectives and constraints should be taken into consideration. For example, a low com-
putational time has to be a main goal. As a result, on-line situation assessment can be
achieved, and based on that, the system performance can be enhanced. The key tasks in
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the proposed research are as follows:
1. To develop a real time state estimation algorithms for the electrical distribution
system without any approximation in terms of the error distribution function.
2. To develop a very short term load forecaster for the forecast aided state estimator.
3. To design an attack resilient control scheme based real time state estimator for on
both single and multi area AGC systems.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows:
1. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on discrete-time filters applied in the electrical dis-
tribution system state estimation. We also provide a review of the literature on the
prediction algorithm applied in the electrical distribution system state estimation.
Moreover, we review the literature on cyber security algorithms used in automatic
generation controls.
2. In Chapter 3, we introduce three filtering algorithms which are the square root cuba-
ture Kalman filter (SCKF), the cubature particle filter (CPF), and the square root
cubature particle filter (SCPF) for the area of distribution system state estimation.
We utilize the µphasor measurement unit to estimate the distribution system states.
The heuristic test load profile is generated based on the expected load shape due to
the distributed generation (DG) proliferation. The sampling time (T ) is assumed to
be 5 sec.
3. In Chapter 4, pseudo measurement generator based very short term load forecasting
(VSTLF) is developed for distribution system state estimation. The test load profile
is generated based on real data. The sampling time (T ) is assumed to be 5 min.
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4. In Chapter 5, an algorithm based state estimator is developed to detect a cyber
attack on both single and multi area AGC systems, and identify the sensors under
attack. A simple switching technique is proposed to mitigate the effect of the cyber
attack allowing the controller to make the right decision.
5. Chapter 6 is divided into two parts: in the first part, a number of key attributes of
the thesis are summarized. The second part outlines a few interesting research topics
we would like to develop in the future.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This literature review is focused on the stages related to main state estimator (SE) archi-
tecture schemes and algorithms, with particular emphasis on the stages involved in active
distribution systems. The primary components associated with a state estimator are first
clarified, and the decentralized algorithm schemes for both power and distribution systems
are then explained. The research related to mathematical modeling of the prediction and
filtering stages for both power systems and active distribution systems is then highlighted.
Studies that introduce techniques for generating pseudo-measurements with respect to dis-
tribution systems are also reviewed. The main focus in this research is the prediction of the
voltage and angle in each bus in order to facilitate advance warning prior to failure, thus
providing the opportunity for optimal decisions. Most state estimators described in the
literature are employed at the transmission level, whose features, in contrast to those of the
distribution level [23], include a radial or tree-like topology; a large R/X ratio of cables;
unbalanced loading; asymmetrical construction; a small number of real-time measurements
characterized by limited reliability (for both analog and digital); limited accuracy with re-
spect to the load data obtained from the load curves; automated meter readings (AMR)
or advanced metering infrastructure (AMI); and discrepancies in real-time measurements,
load data, and static network data such as line impedances or transformer ratings. In
contrast to those in a power system, state estimators in a distribution system need addi-
tional investigation because of their limited application and because of the new challenges
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presented by the requirements anticipated for the grid of the future [94]. State estimators
in active distribution systems perform poorly because of sparse measurements, but placing
a measurement device at each node is economically inviable.
2.1 State Estimator Components
To provide essential background information about SE components, the conventional com-
ponents used in traditional distribution systems are first introduced. New components
that represent technological innovations associated with the smart grid concept are then
briefly analyzed from the perspective of their influence on the conceptual design of future
SE architectures [111].
2.1.1 Remote Terminal Units
A remote terminal unit (RTU) is an electronic device controlled by a microprocessor. The
device interfaces between physical objects and a distributed control system (DCS) or a
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system by transmitting telemetry data
to the system.
2.1.2 Phasor Measurement Unit
As defined in [90], a phasor measurement unit (PMU) is an instrument that measures
voltage and/or current waveforms at the point of connection to the grid using synchronized
sampling based on a common time reference for all locations, commonly facilitated through
a Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite time reference.
2.1.3 Smart Meter
According to [111], smart meter (SM) systems are becoming increasingly available for
medium- and low-voltage distribution grids. In this context, the term smart meter is
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used for identifying either single metering devices or data concentrators, which collect and
process the active or reactive power measurements provided by the aggregated loads at
distribution feeders or secondary substations.
2.2 Background
State estimation is an essential stage in the monitoring and assessment of electrical trans-
mission and distribution networks. It represents a systematic procedure for processing a
set of real and pseudo-measurements in order to estimate bus voltages and angles and,
hence, the current state of a power system. This section provides a review of the literature
related to both centralized and decentralized SE architecture schemes and to both predic-
tion and filtering algorithms. The review begins with a summary of reports that discuss SE
architecture schemes at the transmission level, where they were originally introduced, and
those in distribution networks, along with SE algorithms used in both transmission and
distribution networks. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the state of the art as well as the organization of
the literature review with respect to both the transmission and distribution levels. State
estimators were originally established at the transmission level to insure the stability of a
power system. However, SEs have several additional applications, such as fault detection
(rather than protection), isolation, and reconfiguration, all with the goals of enhancing
reliability, optimizing and rescheduling generation based on the estimated states, and the
ability to compare estimated flows with voltage rating or switching conditions in order to
prevent overloading.
2.3 State Estimator Architecture
The literature includes reports of two schemes for estimating the states of a transmission
and distribution system: centralized and decentralized. In centralized schemes, all mea-
surement data must be sent to a central unit for processing in order to obtain the estimated
states. However, the determination of the states over the whole distribution or transmission



















Figure 2.2: Decentralized schemes: (a) Hierarchical; (b) Distributed
which are expected to expand even further with the anticipated extensive proliferation of
renewable energy sources (RESs) and electric vehicles (EVs). In the second, decentral-
ized, type of scheme, the entire system is divided into a number of zones. Researchers
have proposed several decentralized schemes based on hierarchical and distributed solution
architectures, as shown in Fig. 2.2(a) and (b), respectively. This literature review ad-
dresses decentralized schemes based on distributed architectures because this architecture
has been chosen for the proposed SE based on its avoidance of any kind of centralization
(i.e., sending information to a single unit).
2.4 Decentralized Hierarchical Architecture
In the hierarchical architecture shown in Fig. 2.2(a), the central unit distributes the work
among slave processors, each of which is responsible for its own zone states. The central
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unit then coordinates the local estimates. In this scheme, distributed processors, which
can be located either remotely (distributed architecture) or in the same physical location
(parallel architecture), communicate only with the central computer. A detailed survey of
hierarchical SE approaches has been provided by Gomez-Exposito et al. [37].
2.5 Decentralized Distributed Architecture
As shown in Fig. 2.2(b), in decentralized distributed SE architecture, the coordination
phase performed by the central computer is avoided, so no central computer is needed.
Instead, each local processor that is used for estimating its zone states communicates only
with neighboring processors, exchanging border information at each iteration. As stated
in [38], decentralized distributed architecture is highly dependent on the algorithm used
in the estimator. Therefore, as can be concluded from the following studies, all research
has been based on the interaction principle. With the introduction of the proposed new
estimator algorithm, additional elaboration is required with respect to both the data that
must be exchanged between the zones and the number of iterations needed. The taxonomy
of multi-area state estimation algorithms is addressed in [38]. In [90], [49], [120], [15], [50],
PMUs were utilized for coordinating the voltage angles of the SE solution for each subsys-
tem. The results based on PMUs are quite accurate, specifically with respect to angles.
Recently, SE based compressed sensing [2], [66] is proposed in the literature. However, the
compressed sensing theory is based on a linear transformation which does not fit in the
future smart grid.
2.6 State Estimator Algorithms
Since the method’s first proposal in 1970 [88], many studies have addressed the method’s
inherent problems and treated them in centralized and decentralized schemes. The core
algorithm of most of the proposed SE schemes, whether centralized or decentralized, is
based on a weighted least square (WLS) [77], [74], [113], [81] [37], [45], [116] and [39] or
the Kalman filter (KF) [33] [61]. The WLS methods are computationally efficient, can be
12
implemented easily, and converge quickly. However, it is a non-robust estimator, as any
fluctuations in power generation and customers’ loads in systems with a high penetration
of renewable resources and EVs can severely distort the estimation results [109]. The use
of WLS, both at the transmission level [11], [95], [73] and at the distribution level [82], [83],
is based on the minimization of the following objective:
J = [z − h(x)]TR−1z [z − h(x)] (2.1)
where z and x are the vectors of the measurements and the state components, respectively.
These vectors are assumed to be related according to the equation z = h(x) + ez, in which
h(x) is a known function. The measurement error vector is assumed to be a Gaussian






z3, · · · , σ2zm]. Thus,
σ2zi is the variance of the ith measurement. The minimizer x̂ for the WLS objective is
obtained as the limit of a sequence of states by means of a Newton-based recursive scheme,
one step of which is,
x̂(k + ∆k) = x̂(k) + (H>(x̂(k))R−1z H(x̂(k)))
−1H>(x̂(k))R−1z [z − h(x̂(k))] (2.2)
An estimate of the state error covariance matrix P̂ (x̂(k)) at x̂(k) is given by,
P̂ (x̂(k)) = (H>(x̂(k))R−1z H(x̂(k)))
−1 (2.3)
where H(x̂(k)) Jacobian Matrix evaluated at x̂(k);
x̂(k + ∆k) optimal estimate of x(k + 1), given observations z(k) for sample k;
P̂ (x̂(k)) positive definite symmetric matrix of order n × n, representing the error covari-
ance matrix for the state estimate at sample k. The authors of [97] demonstrated that
the consistency of WLS state estimation relies on the assumptions that P (k + ∆k) and
that the measurements are distributed normally. These assumptions result in the intro-
duction of greater approximation, which leads to divergence because the gain matrix and
the covariance matrix are used recursively to calculate the estimated states. WLS-based
methods are also considered inefficient [72], especially with respect to the penetration of
renewable power resources.
Thus, Kalman filtering techniques are proposed to address and estimate the power
system’s dynamic states. The authors of [8], [76], [10] estimated system states using
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a KF, which is considered the optimal filter to use with linear models and Gaussian
noise [52], [46], [95]. Dynamic state estimator (DSE) methods have been established as a
means of addressing severe power fluctuations in the generation and load. In discrete-time
format, their system model can be represented in state-space form as,
x̂(k + ∆k) = ax(k) +W (k)
z(k + ∆k) = h(x̂(k + ∆k)) + V (k)
(2.4)
where x state vector of order n× 1;
a n× n state transition matrix;
h 1× n observation vector;
W n× 1 vector of white random noise with a covariance matrix Q;
V white random scalar with a variance R uncorrelated with W ;
z observed output;
k kth time sample.
A Kalman estimator is implemented using the following recursive equations [55]:
K(k) = P (k)(H(x̂(k + ∆k)))T [H(x̂(k + ∆k))P (K)(H(x̂(k + ∆k)))T +R]−1
P (k + ∆k) = a(P (k)−K(k)H(x̂(k + ∆k))P (k))aT +Q
x̄(k + ∆k) = x̂(k + ∆k) +K(k)[z(k + ∆k)− h(x̂(k + ∆k))])
(2.5)
where K(k) Kalman gain vector at sample k; x̂(k + ∆k) the predicted states.
However, distribution systems usually behave in a nonlinear manner, and the use of a
KF can lead to inferior estimates of system states. In addition, the variance in the KF
results for the estimated states must be represented as a normal distribution by P (k+∆k)
in order to avoid an inappropriate condition for calculating the gain K(k). Because a KF
relies on the least square principle, it has been shown [97], [46] that the consistency of a KF
state estimation is based on the assumptions that P (k + ∆k) and that the measurements
are normally distributed. As with the WLS technique, these assumptions lead to the
introduction of increased approximation, which creates divergence because of the use of
the gain matrix and the covariance matrix for the recursive calculation of the estimated
states [110], [36].
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The authors of [94], [100], [75], [34], [103] introduced an extended Kalman filter (EKF)
as a means of handling nonlinearity; only the linear expansion terms of a Taylor series are
used [34], and the variations in the process and measurement noise are assumed to be
Gaussian with a zero mean. Like a KF, an EKF relies on the least square principle, and its
state estimation consistency [97], [46] has also been shown to be based on the assumptions
that P (k + ∆k) and that the measurements are normally distributed. Again, greater
approximation is introduced, causing divergence since the gain matrix and the covariance
matrix are used recursively for calculating the estimated states [110]. An EKF can also
result in inaccurate estimations if the system behaves in a highly nonlinear manner. The
primary difference between an EKF and a KF is that the value of x̂(k + ∆k) is used
in equation 2.5, which has been derived from the Taylor series of the system equations
as a means of updating the estimated value iteratively until the difference between two
consecutive estimates equals a very small value. Despite these advances, as with a regular
KF, an EKF can also result in inaccurate estimations if the the measurements have a non-
Gaussian distribution. Other researchers [109], [84], [14] proposed an unscented Kalman
filter (UKF). Unlike an EKF, a UKF provides an enhanced approximates of the state
random variable distribution [110]. Recently, a powerful dynamic filter, known as the
cubature Kalman filter (CKF), has been added to the KF family [5], [4], and the CKF
was introduced for power system state estimation by [92], [93]. Unlike a UKF, a CKF uses
a more accurate representation of the state random variable distribution and can work
efficiently in a high-dimensional space [5]; however it still represents the posterior state
distribution using a Gaussian random variable. The distribution systems’ lack or sparseness
of measurement sensors makes the use of pseudo-measurements crucial for ensuring system
observability. However, pseudo-measurements generate a high degree of uncertainty and
a non-Gaussian distribution [67]. All of the above methods (KF, EKF, WLS, UKF, and
CKF) are used to estimate the voltage states, assuming a Gaussian representation of the
pseudo-measurements. This introduces an additional error due to the approximation of the
non-Gaussian distribution function, as the error associated with the pseudo-measurements
has a non-Gaussian distribution [67], [63]. Moreover, WLS- and KF-based techniques
provide estimated states with a Gaussian distribution, which introduces another source of
approximation. The above two sources of approximation may lead the estimator to diverge.
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A detailed comparative review of a variety of these techniques can be found in [97].
To overcome the drawbacks of high levels of uncertainty, PF-based algorithms have
been proposed in [3], [7], [87], [56], [71], [57], [13], [26], [25]. A primary benefit of the
PF is that it handles the non-Gaussian measurements [85], [110]. Although the principle
of PF has been applied to efficiently estimate the states of a distribution system, the test
system used to validate the proposed algorithm is relatively small, containing only 14 buses.
Moreover, several issues related to distribution systems have not been included, such as
the effect of dynamics of a system, distributed generation (DG), high nonlinearity, and
pseudo-measurements.
2.7 Pseudo Measurement Generator
There are two approaches in the literature to predict the states of the electrical distribution
system [21],[20]. The first one, achieved by modeling the states dynamic (the evolution
of the states over the time), and the second is accomplished by forecasting the load and
then predicting the future states through either static or dynamic SE. For the first one,
since the method was first proposed in [19], there are several models that have been used
to predict the state dynamics of the distribution system. The method proposed in [19]
is based on the quasi steady state behavior and slow dynamics of the power system. To
overcome the difficulties of modeling the time behavior of the system, it has been assumed
that the next state will be the same as the previous state, except for some uncertainties
pointed out by Debs et al. [19]. By solving the power flow equation of the system, given the
power at each bus, the corresponding time behavior can be obtained for the conventional
load profile. So, as in [19], the value of the maximum rate of the change vector has been
calculated. In [16], [109] a nonlinear algorithms, was used to model the state evolution
of the distribution system without any linearization, which increases the accuracy of the
state estimator. The following equation has been used:
xk+∆k = Fkxk + gk + qk (2.6)
where, xk is the state vector comprising the magnitudes and angles of the nodal voltages.
Matrix Fk and vector gk describe the transition process of the states, and qk is the white
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Gaussian noise vector of the prediction model at time k. With the help of the Holts expo-
nential smoothing, the accuracy of the parameters have been increased. In [22], [43], [44],
the impact of the neighbor buses have been studied and included in the model parameters.
In [21], [99] the artificial neural network was trained using only information by monitor-
ing the power system for a short amount of time. Livani et al. [64] used historical data
about load and wind generation in order to train a Markov model (MM), which describes
the evolution of the states over a specific amount of time. The historical data was not
enough to train the model, however, a Monte Carlo simulation was used in order to gen-
erate enough data. Because the data has some uncertainties in it, a state estimator has
been used in order to obtain filtered predicted states. Most of the effort done to model
the dynamic of the system state is based on historical and forecast data. Therefore, once
an efficient forecasting algorithm is used an efficient transition model of the state can be
obtained. Most of the forecasting algorithms available in the literature are based on regres-
sion based methods [40], including persistence [32], extrapolation [30], [65], [121] , [118],
time series [17], [62], [89], [105], Kalman filters [107], [51], fuzzy logic [18], [117], and neural
networks (NNs) [91], [12], [47]. A summary of the most commonly-used methods for load
estimation is provided in [21]. Recently, an algorithm of the wavlet neural network (WNN)
has been developed by [41] to forecast the load of ISO New England power system by also
using it’s data set.
2.8 Cyper Security in AGC system
The work in [104] assumes that the frequency sensor is well protected and builds their
detection model based on a comparison between the prediction of frequency and the mea-
sured one. Therefore, in case of losing the frequency measurement the detection algo-
rithm will be no longer functioning, leaving great chance for the attacker to manipulate
the system. Many of the proposed detection and identification algorithms for security of
AGCs [102, 101, 6, 9, 106] use limited attack templates that cannot characterize real-world
attackers well. In [101] the author proposed a statistical method based on maximizing
the likelihood of detecting the attacked sensor. However, many of the statistical meth-
ods [58, 68, 69], including [101], have the problem of false positives and false negatives.
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The work of [101] has reported 5 % false positives and false negatives. The proposed miti-
gation strategy in [104, 101] is, upon detecting an attack, to replace the sensor data with
forecasting data. Such a strategy can cause large deviation from the nominal frequency
due to forecasting error. The work in [104] identifies the sensors under attack after 20
seconds from the onset of the attack. The mitigation algorithm proposed in [104] is based
on neglecting the measurements from the sensors under attack. Therefore, the attacker
can manipulate the AGC system during the 20 second period, causing at least some profit
losses to the owner or even triggering the remedial action. The work in [80], [29] have
formulated the state estimation problem using mixed integer linear programming (MILP).
However, the authors assume that the system is noiseless. No mitigation solution has been
proposed in [80], [29], [27], [78].
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Chapter 3
Electrical Distribution System State
Estimation For Real Time Operation
3.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to introduce new SEs that can handle the challenges of fu-
ture distribution grids with higher accuracy. These challenges include the following: the
sparseness or lack of sensors due to economic restrictions, the non-Gaussian representa-
tion of estimated states and pseudo-measurements, and the high degree of fluctuation in
generation and customer loads. The proposed estimators, which are the cubature particle
filter (CPF) and square root cubature particle filter (SCPF), address the above challenges
and the limitations of the existing tools, and solves the problem in a distributed manner
leveraging the distributed algorithm proposed in [74]. The SCPF and CPF techniques are
still in its infancy, even in signal processing, and only few publications are available in
that area. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only [55] and [54] have implemented
the CPF and SCPF in different applications, which are not related to power system state
estimations. We also introduce the square root cubature Kalman filter (SCKF), which is
the improved version of the CKF recently introduced for power system state estimation
by [92], for the first time for the electrical distribution system state estimation. Due to
their superiority over the other existing state estimation techniques, the SCKF, CPF, and
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SCPF are proposed in this chapter. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the three pro-
posed estimators have been introduced for the first time for state estimation applications in
the power system area, for either transmission or distribution levels. The CPF and SCPF
are capable of processing non-Gaussian representations of pseudo-measurements directly
without Gaussian distribution approximation. Moreover, the proposed algorithms treat
the problem in a distributed fashion; as a result, the estimators can work for large-scale
electrical distribution systems while providing accurate estimations within a short period
of time. The distribution system will be clustered according to the algorithm proposed
in [74], and the state of each zone will be estimated in parallel. Additionally, this chapter
provides a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed SCKF, CPF, and SCPF under normal
and abnormal operations. This chapter also provides a comprehensive comparison study
between the SCKF, CPF, SCPF and the latest versions of state estimation algorithms. The
results show that the proposed SEs have a superior performance compared to the latest
estimation algorithms (EKF, UKF, and CKF). The research investigates the performance




h (x) Nonlinear function (power flow equation relating the injected power
to the voltage magnitudes and angles)
v Measurement noise vector
x Vector of the state variables
















Particle proposal distribution vector of the states
Ik Prior evaluated at time instant k
k Likelihood evaluated at time instant k
ık Proposal distribution evaluated at time instant k
wk Importance weight
ŵk Normalized weight of each particle
x̂k|k Estimated state of each particle
Ŝk|k Estimated variance of each estimated particle
3.3 Zoning
The proposed zoning method is a modified version of the zoning method proposed in [74].
First, consider a distribution system comprising n buses collected as a set of vertices V :=
{1, 2, · · · , n}, and overhead or underground lines represented by a set of edges E ⊆ V ×V .
The proposed solution is based on the following assumptions [74].
1. The distribution system is partitioned into L > 1 zones ZOl ⊂ V, l ∈ {1, 2, · · ·L}
and ZOl ∩ ZOj = ∅ based on topological or geographical criteria. To have similar
execution times for individual zones, the number of buses per zone should be kept
approximately equal;
2. If two zones are connected, then at least one of the two zones is extended to share
at least one bus with the other zone. After extension, at least one of the shared
buses between the two zones is assumed to be fully monitored through a suitable
measurement point. This is just to maximize the number of real measurement per
zone; and
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3. Each extended zone has a local center time-synchronized through the global position-
ing system (GPS) where the local estimation is carried out; such computing nodes
work in parallel and communicate with the local center of adjacent areas.





= ZOl ∪ {i| (i, j) ∈ E, i ∈ ZOl, j ∈ ZOk, l < k}.
The above zone extension procedure is demonstrated in the modified IEEE 123 bus
system shown in Fig. 3.1. The IEEE 123 test system is modified by connecting DG at buses
17 and 79, which results in a non-Gaussian distribution of the pseudo-measurement in most
of the buses [60]. Furthermore, several links are introduced in the system, highlighted in
the dashed line in Fig. 3.1, to upgrade the operation into a mesh configuration, and hence,
the power flow becomes bidirectional with high uncertainty. For example, the links between
bus 41 and bus 95 and between bus 73 and bus 74 have been added to the original system.
Fig. 3.1 shows the L = 4 original zones ZOl and the extended zone ZO
1
, highlighted with
dashed and solid lines, respectively. According to the rules of zoning stated previously,
ZO1 is extended to share at least one bus with its neighbor zones, and as a result, the
extended version of ZO1, which is ZO
1
(highlighted in the solid line in Fig. 3.1 ), includes
bus 17 (to share one bus with ZO4) and (bus 95 and 79) (to share one bus with ZO2 and
ZO3 respectively). The extended version of ZO2, which is ZO
2
(highlighted in the solid
line in Fig. 3.1) includes bus 79 (to share one bus with Z3). The extended version of ZO3,
which is ZO
3
(highlighted in the solid line in Fig. 3.1) includes bus 73 (to share one bus
with ZO4). ZO4 is equal to ZO
4
, as after the extension of the previous zones, ZO4 shares
at least one bus with its neighbour zones.
Each zone estimates its state independently as a first step described in [74] and allows
efficient estimation of the state within a controlled time. The zoning algorithm allows the
system state to be estimated in a fully distributed manner in two steps (see [74] for more
details).
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Figure 3.1: IEEE 123-bus system zoned according to the proposed algorithm
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3.4 The Proposed Filter Scheme
The objective is to estimate the distribution system bus voltage magnitudes and angles
within each zone ZO
l
. The proposed SCPF technique is constructed by a combination of
the SCKF and PF. It recursively updates the estimates using the previous estimated value
from time k − 1 and the measurements (real and pseudo) at time k to provide the final
estimation of the bus voltage magnitudes and angles at time instant k.
At each zone ZO
l
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is the vector of real power measurements provided by the micro phasor-measurement units
(µPMUs). zp ∈ Rn
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z are the number of
real and pseudo-measurement, respectively. In compact notation, the set of measurement
equations that include the injected active and reactive power and power flows between
zones can be written as follows:
z = h (x) + v (3.1)
where, h(x) is a nonlinear function (power flow equation relating the injected power to
the voltage magnitudes and angles). v is the measurement noise, with either a Gaussian
or non-Gaussian distribution.
x ∈ Rnx is the vector of the state variables. nx is the total number of state variables.
The states that going to be estimated are the voltage magnitude and angle at each bus
x :=
[
|v1| · · · |vnx
2
| δ1 · · · δnx
2
]>
. µPMUs are assumed to be available on buses 1 (primary
substation) and 17 and 79 (DG buses). Five additional µPMUs are optimally located at
buses 24, 62, 77, and 89 using the ordinal optimization approach described in [98]. Having
a µPMU at bus m means that the voltage vm[k] and the current
∑
n:m∼n imn are both
available, where m ∼ n denotes that bus m and n are connected through a line. Instead of
current measurements, we can easily derive and use the injected active and reactive power
and the power flow in the lines connected to the bus equipped by the µPMU. In the case
where there is no µPMU in the bus, the power injected (P and Q) is extracted from a
forecast data (pseudo-measurements). Table 3.1 shows the real measurement provided by
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Ratio in Eq (3.2)
Predicted States 
in Particle Form
Move all Particles 
















Figure 3.2: The proposed SCPF estimator graphical representation
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Table 3.1: Measurements of various quantities at different Buses
Zone. Measurements
1 V1, V17, V79, P1, P17, P79, Q1, Q17, Q79
2 V79, V89, P79, P89, Q79, Q89
3 V77, V79, P77, P79, Q77, Q79
4 V17, V24, , V62, P17, P24, , P62, , Q17, Q24, , Q62
µPMU.
The PF algorithm forms the core of the proposed estimator. Unlike the KF-based algo-
rithms, a PF is a non-Gaussian algorithm, which matches the requirements of distribution
systems. The PF is a non-Gaussian algorithm in the sense that it accepts non-Gaussian
measurements without any approximation, and produces non-Gaussian estimates. The PF
is based primarily on four sub-algorithms: a perfect Monte Carlo simulation, Bayesian im-
portance sampling, sequential importance sampling (SIS), and re-sampling (SIR) [110] [3].
The details of these sub-algorithms are explained in [3]. These sub-algorithms lead to (3.9),














Here, wk is the particle weight vector of the states of ZO
l 1. at time instant k, and zk















is the particle proposal distribution vector of the states of ZOl, which is
provided by the SCKF. Data processing of the proposed algorithm is graphically illustrated





1For this section we abuse the notation by ignoring the superscript l, to avoid overloading the notation.
However, all the calculations in this section are done per zone
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the degeneration of the SIS, each particle is re-sampled according to its weight. The SIR
algorithm is implemented in this chapter, where a sample with a high importance weight
regenerates more often than those with a lower importance weight, as shown in Fig. 3.2.













, which provides the nor-
malization constant for the posterior.
The SCKF is developed using the least-squares method for the cubature Kalman gain
and matrix triangular factorization or triangularization for the covariance updates. The
least-squares method avoids the explicit computation of matrix inversion, whereas trian-
gularization essentially computes a triangular square-root factor of the covariance without
square rooting a squared-matrix form of the covariance. The SCKF essentially propagates
the square roots of the predictive and posterior error covariances and offers the following
benefits as compared to the CKF introduced in [92]:
1. Preservation of symmetry and positive (semi) definiteness [5]; and
2. Numerical accuracy enhancment [5].
The SCPF algorithm is explained as follows2:
At each time instant k perform the following:
For each particle j ∈ {1, · · · , N},
1. Evaluate the prior as follows:
Ik =
exp(−0.5(x̄k|k − x̂k−1|k−1)>Q−1(x̄k|k − x̂k−1|k−1))
(3.3)
where, x̂k−1|k−1 ∈ Rnx is the previous estimated states. Q ∈ Rnx×nx is process
covariance matrix. x̄k|k ∈ Rnx is the propagated particle which is computed as
follows:
x̄k|k = ẍk|k + Γk|k. (3.4)
2The CPF is also designed in same manner by including the CKF as sub-algorithm.
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where, Γk|k ∈ Rnx ∼ N (0, Sk|k). Sk|k is estimated covariance matrix provided by the
SCKF. ẍk|k is the estimated states computed by the SCKF as follows:





where, ẋk|k−1 ∈ Rnx is the predicted state vector computed as shown in Section 3.4.1.
Kk is the Kalman gain computed as shown in Section 3.4.1. zk ∈ Rnz is the mea-








Ẑi,k|k−1 is the the predicted measurement vector evaluated at cubature point i (see
Section 3.4.1 for more details). m = 2nx is the number of the cubature points.
2. Evaluate the likelihood as follows:
k = exp(−0.5(zk − ẑk|k−1)>R−1(zk − ẑk|k−1)) (3.7)
where, R ∈ Rnz×nz is measurement covariance matrix.
3. Evaluate the proposal distribution as follows:
ık =
exp(−0.5(x̄k|k − ẍk|k)>S−1k|k(x̄k|k − ẍk|k))√
|Sk|k|
(3.8)





5. After calculating the importance weight of each particle3, we normalize the weight







3All the above calculations are per particle j. We abuse the notation by ignoring the superscript j, to
avoid overloading the notation.
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6. After normalizing the importance weight of each particle, the re-sampling algorithm
is now applied to copy the fit particle and eliminate the lower-importance particles



















Therefore, the expectation of the variance P [k] can be calculated as:









After each local estimator estimates its state independently, Step 2 (explained in the par-
allel processing algorithm proposed in [74] ) is used to synchronize all zones.
3.4.1 Square Root Cubature Kalman Filter
As stated in the introduction, we leverage the results in [5] to provide the proposal distri-
bution for PF. In this section, we provide the SCKF algorithm details [5] which used as a
sub-algorithm of the SCPF.
First, we compute the predicted state vector, using the transition model presented
in [119]. The steps of calculating the predicted state vector is as follows:
1. For each cubature point i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, calculate the following:






4 is the cubature point-weight set. Ŝk−1|k−1 ∈ Rnx×nx is the previous
estimated covariance matrix. m = 2nx is the number of cubature points.
4ei − ith natural basis vector for Rnx
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2. compute the predicted state vector for each propagated cubature point i.
X̂i,k|k−1 = Xi,k−1|k−1 −H−1(Xi,k−1|k−1)(
Yk|k−1 − Yk−1|k−1
) (3.14)
We use the transition model presented in [119]. The matrix H−1 ∈ Rnx×nz =
∂h(x)/∂x is the Jacobin matrix evaluated at Xi,k−1|k−1. X̂i,k|k−1 ∈ Rnx is the pre-
dicted state vector at cubature point i. Yk−1|k−1 and Yk|k−1 are respectively the
forecast injected power at time k − 1 and k.







4. Once the predicted state vector is calculated, the square root of the predicted error
covariance can be estimated as follows:
Sk|k−1 = Tria([κ̂k|k−1 SQ,k−1]), (3.16)
where SQ,k−1 denotes a square root of Q ∈ Rnx×nx such that Q = SQ,k−1S>Q,k−1.




[X̂1,k|k−1 − x̂k|k−1 X̂2,k|k−1 − x̂k|k−1
X̂m,k|k−1 − x̂k|k−1]
(3.17)
Upon receiving the measurements, the predicted state vector can be further filtered
using the following:
1. Let PK : Rnx → Rn
p
x be the linear map which takes a vector y ∈ Rnx and removes
the rows corresponding to the measured states.
2. Let x̂k|k−1,p = PKx̂k|k−1.







4. For each cubature point i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, compute the following.
Xi,k|k−1 = Sk|k−1ξi + ẋk|k−1, (3.18)
5. Compute the predicted measurement for each Xi,k|k−1 computed using 3.18:
Ẑi,k|k−1 = h(Xi,k|k−1), (3.19)
6. Square root of the innovations covariance matrix is calculated as follows:
Szz,k|k−1 = Tria([Υ̂k|k−1 SR,k]), (3.20)




[Ẑ1,k|k−1 − ẑk|k−1 Ẑ2,k|k−1 − ẑk|k−1
Ẑm,k|k−1 − ẑk|k−1]
(3.21)




where, Pxz,k|k−1 is the cross-covariance matrix (see [5] for more details in calculating
Pxz,k|k−1 )
8. The corresponding error covariance is calculated as follows:
Sk|k = Tria([κk|k−1 −KkΥ̂k|k−1 KkSR,k]), (3.23)
Fig. 3.3 reflects the real scenario in the terms of the load having a high probability of
being negative (i.e., the demand is greater than the generation of the RES available on
the customer side), but, conversely, it also has a possibility of being positive because of
the unpredictable nature of the RES. Clearly, as described in Fig. 3.3, the distribution of
5/ is used to denote the matrix right division operator, which applies the back substitution algorithm
for an upper triangular matrix S and the forward substitution algorithm for a lower triangular matrix S
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Figure 3.3: Measurement distribution [67]
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the original data does not follow a Gaussian distribution. The original data distribution
and the best-fit Gaussian distribution (obtained by Expected Maximization (EM) [115])
are put side by side to show the significant difference. In fact, the highest intensity of
load, according to the Gaussian distribution occurs around -5 KW, while the intensity of
the original data distribution occurs around -10 KW. The intensity of the original data
distribution around the -5 KW is exceedingly low.
3.5 Simulation Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Generation of Bus Profiles
The IEEE 123-bus system is upgraded by including two DGs located at buses 17, 79 and 97.
Moreover, a high degree of variations in the load profiles with uncertainty are considered
to simulate the effect of RESs and EVs on the customer side, as shown in Fig. 3.4. In
this chapter, the authors used extreme examples to represent the dynamic behavior of the
system in order to fully test the proposed algorithms. For example, in Fig. 3.4(a) and (b),
the load curves have high-frequency behavior as a result of the RESs and EVs available on
the customer side. Moreover, the value of the active load at several instants in Fig. 3.4(a)
is negative, which simulates the case when customers are supplying a power to the grid,
as the power provided by the RESs and EVs and/or the DG becomes greater than the
demand for that particular bus. From the above discussion the load for the buses 17, 79
and 97 is assumed to be sampled from the set [-0.04 0.045]. Moreover, all buses except
buses 17, 79 and 97 is assumed to be sampled from the set [-0.003 0.008]. These load profile
generated from these sets give highest load with of the distribution system with value 1.2
p.u. and lowest value -0.6 p.u.. These design assumptions are justifiable as the reverse
power is expected to be 60% of the load in the presence of the high penetration of the
DGs either in customer side or as an aggregated one. Moreover, a high fluctuation can be
obtained from these design assumptions which simulate the expected behavior of the DGs
and EVs. The reactive power for each bus is generated by assuming that the power factor
varies between 0.85 to 0.99. To evaluate the accuracy of the proposed SEs, several tests
were performed using Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. The number of MC simulations is
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10,000, and for each simulation, a set of 96 sequential true data samples is generated for
each bus. The 10,000 scenarios generated can cover all the possible circumstances that the
distribution system may experience. The non-Gaussian pseudo-measurements (the true
representation) are generated using GMM (3 Gaussian components) with (σ1 + σ2 + σ3)
equivalent to 50% error. We choose 3 Gaussian components following the result of the
work presented in [67].
As stated in [70], the relationship between the states and the measurement becomes
more nonlinear in the heavy loading condition. Therefore, to test the performance of
the proposed SEs in different extreme cases, the authors created heavy loading conditions
between samples 80 and 90 ( k = 80 to k = 90). In this particular case, the demand
became slightly larger than the generation. The authors used the interval between 80 and
90, as peak consumption occurs between 6 pm (80) and 8:30 pm (90) for most countries.
Fig. 3.4 shows 96 sequential samples of the true values and pseudo-measurements of the
load profile of bus 97. The 96 samples were chosen to highlight the fact that the load might
have negative values for active and reactive power.
3.5.2 Performance Evaluation
The IEEE 123-bus system is used to evaluate the performance of the proposed SCKF, CPF,
and SCPF under normal and abnormal operations, and the performance of the proposed
algorithms is compared against the latest versions of the least square family [52] with
different combinations of filtering schemes. The underlying network topology is assumed
to be known a priori and fixed over the time duration of state estimation. The load flow
results at each time instant (k = 1 to 96) using true values are calculated and used as a
benchmark to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed algorithms. The maximum values of
the relative errors in voltage magnitudes (MRE) and angles (ARE) are used to assess the





























































































































































Figure 3.4: Samples of true and pseudo-measurements data at bus 97: a- active power and
b- reactive power.
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where, V̂i is the estimated voltage magnitude at bus i, Vi is the true value, θ̂i is the
estimated angle, and θi is the true value. The estimator result is considered satisfactory
if the MREmax is smaller than 1% and the AREmax is smaller than 5% [98] in all system
states.
Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8 show the results of the performance of the
proposed state estimators and the latest version in the KF family CKF using (MRE) and
(ARE) metrics. The x-axis represents bus numbers included in zone 1 and zone 2 in
ascending order. The y-axis in Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8, represents either












The MREmax and AREmax
6 for all buses in zone 1 and zone 2 are for O = 96 time
instants for Mc = 10, 000 Monte Carlo simulation. Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8
show the results when we draw the pseudo-measurement from the non-Gaussian distribu-
tion, i.e., when we assume that the pseudo-measurement has a non-Gaussian distribution.
For zone 1, using the CPF, the AREmax is 15%(> 5.0%) and MREmax is 1.05%(< 1%),
while using the CKF, the AREmax is 47.5%(> 5.0%) and MREmax is 7.9%(> 1%). More-
over, using the SCPF for zone 1, the AREmax is 4%(< 5.0%) and MREmax is 0.9%(< 1%),
while using the SCKF, the AREmax is 27.1%(> 5.0%) and MREmax is 4.3%(> 1%). The








One can notice that, in terms of accuracy the best performance is obtained by the
SCPF and, then, the CPF. Moreover, the SCKF show better performance compared to
the the CKF in terms of accuracy, while the SCKF shows less performance compared to









































































































Figure 3.5: (a) Relative voltage angle error for zone 1, CKF, and CPF, (b) Relative voltage
angle error for zone 1, SCKF, and SCPF.
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Table 3.2: SCPF performance summary for non-Gaussian pseudo-measurement (uncer-
tainty 50%)
Zone. MREmax AREmax MREave AREave
1 9.0× 10−3 40.0× 10−3 6.0× 10−3 18.1× 10−3
2 3.8× 10−3 38.1× 10−3 2.8× 10−3 13.5× 10−3
3 4.2× 10−3 38.4× 10−3 2.7× 10−3 14.4× 10−3
4 8.8× 10−3 39.3× 10−3 5.3× 10−3 17.3× 10−3
the CPF and SCPF in terms of accuracy. The evaluation results of applying the SCPF
technique on the whole IEEE 123-bus system are summarized in Table 3.2. MREave and














where, |ZOl| represent the cardinality of the zone l (i.e., the number of buses in the zone l).
Table 3.2 shows the results for the case of non-Gaussian measurements with an uncertainty
equal to 50% for all zones. From Table 3.2 one can notice the performance difference in
terms of accuracy between the zones. One reason for this is that we use less number
of particles (N = 65) to estimate the states of ZO1 and ZO4, compared to (N = 90) to
estimate the states of ZO2 and ZO3. The reason for this is that we want the computational
time of each zone to be approximately equal (1.9 s). We can conclude that, as the size
of the zone increases, the computational time increases. Another reason for the difference
in terms of accuracy between the zones is that the R/X ratios in the ZO1 is higher than
R/X ratios in the ZO2.
In this subsection, the proposed algorithm is tested for one expected case in order to







































































































Figure 3.6: (a) Relative voltage magnitude error for zone 1, CKF, and CPF, (b) relative
































































































Figure 3.7: (a) Relative voltage angle error for zone 2, CKF, and CPF, (b) Relative voltage
































































































Figure 3.8: (a) Relative voltage magnitude error for zone 2, CKF, and CPF, (b) Relative
voltage angle error for zone 2, SCKF, and SCPF.
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Table 3.3: SCPF performance summary for non-Gaussian pseudo-measurement (uncer-
tainty 30% )
Zone. MREmax AREmax MREave AREave
1 8.4× 10−3 37.6× 10−3 5.6× 10−3 17.1× 10−3
2 3.6× 10−3 35.8× 10−3 2.6× 10−3 12.7× 10−3
3 3.9× 10−3 36.1× 10−3 2.5× 10−3 13.7× 10−3
4 8.3× 10−3 36.9× 10−3 5.0× 10−3 16.6× 10−3
shown in Table 3.2. The expected case that was tested is the effect of the quality of the
pseudo-measurements.
First, the authors want to show how the performance of the proposed algorithm is
sensitive to uncertainty of the pseudo-measurements. In this test, there was a simulation
of the case where the available power measurements from smart meters are used to enhance
the accuracy of the load forecaster. This case was simulated by adding an error of 30%
to the true value instead of 50%, which is used in the basic case. The results show that
performance increased for all zones. When the results in Table 3.2 are compared with the
results in Table 3.3, we can see that the performance of the estimator was enhanced by
approximately 4% to 8% due to the enhancement of the pseudo-measurement accuracy.
To ensure the robustness of the proposed algorithm, the SCPF algorithm is tested
under abnormal operations. A sudden change in the voltage magnitude and the angle of
bus 90 is simulated for Sample 15 (Fig. 3.9). In this case, the demand became much larger
than the generation for one time instant. Correctly estimating the states in the case of
sudden changes is very important, especially when the frequency sensor of the automatic
generation controller (AGC) is attacked. The attacker can compromise the sensor data to
give the false impression to the operator that no change in the load is occurring. Using the
estimated states provided by the proposed estimator allows the operator to figure out the
situation in the system from different sources of data, and then take action. The proposed




Figure 3.9: True and estimated values of the voltage magnitude and angle results during
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Figure 3.10: Relative Voltage Magnitude Error for the proposed algorithms and the most
common versions of the KF-based algorithm.
the proposed SCPF algorithm was tested with different r/x ratios between 0.5 and 3.5,
and showed satisfactory results even with greater ratios.
To make this paper self-standing, the latest versions of the KF-based algorithm have
been simulated. Fig. 3.10 shows the MREmax% of the proposed algorithms and the
most common versions of the KF-based algorithm. Fig. 3.11 shows the AREmax% of the
proposed algorithms and the most common versions of the KF-based algorithm. The
EKF-Case shows the algorithm’s good performance in estimating the states of voltage
magnitudes (MREmax% = 13.22) and its poor performance in estimating voltage angles
(AREmax% = 70.90). A noticeable enhancement in accuracy is achieved (MREmax% = 3.02
and AREmax% = 26.12) when combining the EKF and PF (EPF-Case). The UKF-Case
provided additional enhancement in accuracy as compared with the EPF-Case. While the


















EKF EPF UKF UPF CKF CPF SCKF SCPF
Figure 3.11: Relative Voltage Angle Error for the proposed algorithms and the most com-
mon versions of the KF-based algorithm.
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imum ARE equal to 66.30%(> 5%). A noticeable enhancement in accuracy is achieved
(MREmax% = 2.70 and AREmax% = 25.19) when combining the UKF and PF (UPF-Case).
It is worth noting that the results based on the first step described in [74] are less accurate
than than the two-step one presented above by 8% to 10%.
The simulations suggest that, for applications in which the measurements have a Gaus-
sian distribution, the best choice is the introduced SCKF. This is because when we test the
SCKF, CPF, and SCPF with measurement with Gaussian distribution, the performance
in term of accuracy was almost the same with slightly better performance for the SCPF
and CPF. However, the computational time recorded for the SCKF is 0.01 s, while for
the CPF and SCPF it is 1.9 s. The proposed SCPF and CPF can be applied in several
applications such as voltage regulation, where the accuracy of the estimation is more im-
portant than the computational time. The SCKF can be used in the application where
the computational time is more important. We believe that the supercomputer of the
power system operator (PSO) can estimate the system states using SCPF or CPF in much
faster time. The performance of all the simulated algorithms in descending (i.e., from the
highest to lowest performance) order in terms of accuracy is as follows: 1. SCPF, 2. CPF,
3. UPF, 4. EPF, 5. SCKF, 6. CKF, 7. UKF, 8. , and EKF. The performance of all the
simulated algorithms in descending (i.e., from the highest to lowest performance) order in
terms of computational time is as follows: 1. EKF, 2. CKF, 3. SCKF, 4. UKF, 5. EPF,
6. CPF, 7. SCPF, and 8. UPF. The previous performance comparisons are done based on
non-Gaussian measurement distribution.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents SE based on combining the PF and SCKF. We also leverage the
SCKF and CPF algorithms for the first time in the electrical distribution system state
estimation. The proposed methods transforms a large distribution network into a number
of smaller, manageable-size systems (zones). The proposed SCPF and CPF algorithms are
capable of processing the non-Gaussian representation of pseudo-measurements without a
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Gaussian distribution approximation. The proposed SEs were applied to an IEEE 123-bus
system, and the simulation results demonstrated a superior performance in terms of accu-
racy compared to other estimation algorithms (EKF, UKF, and CKF). Simulations with
varying R/X ratios and over a range of different loading conditions show that the proposed
SE algorithms is a robust estimator that offers accurate, reliable, and fast estimation.
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Chapter 4
Forecast Aided State Estimator for
an Electrical Distribution System
4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a new forecasting aided state estimation algorithm for a distri-
bution system wide area monitoring. The proposed algorithm composed of two sub-
algorithms. The first sub-algorithm is developed to forecast the load of each bus. The
second sub-algorithm is developed to estimate the states of each bus using the results of
the first sub-algorithm. For the first sub-algorithm, this chapter introduces a wavelet re-
current neural network (WRNN) to model the load at each bus in the distribution system.
For training the WRNN, this chapter proposes a new training technique based on square
root cubature kalman filter (SCKF). This chapter uses the proposed forecasting algorithm,
to estimate the distribution system states. For the second sub-algorithm, this chapter uses
an efficient state estimator based on SCKF to estimate the voltage magnitude and angle
on each bus. This chapter integrates the VSTLF and the state estimator to design a robust
state estimator. Based on the results of the proposed state estimator a voltage situation







Sk|k−1 Predicted error covariance
Szz,k|k−1 Innovations covariance matrix
Pxz,k|k−1 Cross-covariance matrix
Kk Square-root cubature Kalman gain
Sk|k Corresponding error covariance
xk|k Estimated state at time instant k
4.3 Pseudo-Measurements Generator
Fig. 4.1, shows the main stages for the proposed work which are represented by the or-
ange blocks. The black blocks are drawn just for the sake of a complete illustration of the
distribution system supervisory control and data acquisition (DSCADA). A link will be
made through which the output of the state estimator is fed back to the pseudo measure-
ments generator. The proposed VSTLF will increase the immunization of the proposed
state estimator against the delay and loss of the real measurements due to the communi-
cation failure. The approach shown in Fig. 4.1 is designed so that the SE can operate in
either real-time mode, applying any real-time measurements available from the network
along with load estimates, or in forecasting mode to forecast future network states for





















Distribution System Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(DSCADA)
Figure 4.1: DSCADA system
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4.3.1 Pseudo-Measurements Generator Design
1. A recurrent neural network (RNN) was considered to model the load dynamic. The
model of the RNN is explained as follows:
ẑk = βk[f(θk, uk, ri, ok−1)
> gi]
> (4.1)
where, ẑk = [ẑ1 ẑ2 · · · ẑnz ]
> ∈ Rnz is the RNN output. gi := {1 : ∀ i ≤ nz} is
the output layer bias input. ri := {1 : ∀ i ≤ nl} is the hidden layer bias input.





]> ∈ Rnu+nb is the input to the
RNN. uk,1 = [u1 u2 · · ·unu ]
> ∈ Rnu . uk,2 = [unu+1 unu+2 · · ·unu+nb ]
> ∈ Rnb . θk ∈
Rnl×(nu+nl+nb+1). nz is the number of output. nl is the number of hidden neurons.
nu is the number of the input loads. nb is the number of the input time index.
f(θk, uk, ri, ok−1) = [f1 f2 · · · fnl ]
> ∈ Rnl is the hidden neuron output as shown in
Fig. 4.2 and illustrated in great details in training algorithm steps. ok−1 ∈ Rnl is
the input to the RNN which is also the hidden layer output at k − 1. The difference
between the RNN and FNN is that the output of the hidden layer is fed-back to the
Neural Network.
2. Before the training algorithm of the presented models of the RNNs is going to be
presented , the preparation of the data is firstly explained. Following [41] The data
set from ISO New England is decomposed into three data sets using the wavelet
decomposer. It resulted in three components which are low frequency component (L),
low-high frequency component (LH), and high frequency component (H) as shown in
Fig. 4.3. This chapter uses uLk to denote the low frequent component of the data set,
uLHk to denote the low high frequency component of the data set, and u
H
k to denote the
high frequency component of the data set. Based on the analysis performed in [41] the
low frequency component of the data set has a nearly linear relationship, while the low
high and high frequency component have non-linear relationships. Therefore, three
different RNN are used to model the behavior of the three different components of
the data set as shown in Fig. 4.3. EKFRNN denotes the RNN trained by EKF for low
frequency component of the data set. SCKRNN1 denotes the RNN trained by SCKF
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Figure 4.2: Recurrent neural network configuration
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by SCKF for low-high frequency component of the data set. The low frequency data
set is further manipulated to be ready for training. The low frequency component of
the data set is transformed using the relative increment transformation (RI). The
reason for using the RI transformation is to make the low frequency component of
the data set stationary [41]. The transformed low frequency component of the data
set is further normalized using 4.2 to satisfy require of the NN.






where, G ∈ {LH H}. uGmax and uGmin respectively denote the maximum and mini-
mum value of the G component of the data set. In the following remaining part of
Section 4.3.1, the training algorithm is explained using the high and the low-high
frequency components of the data set (ûHk , and û
LH
k ).
3. Now, the proposed training algorithm is going to be presented. Unlike the training
algorithm proposed in [41], the proposed algorithm in this chapter is based on the
SCKF, which is proven to work well with highly nonlinear systems, and has more
numerical accuracy [5]. Fig. 4.4 shows the schematic diagram of the training model 1
which is described in details as follows:
(a) Evaluate the cubature points i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, where m = 2nx. nx = nl(nu +
nb+nl +1)+nz(nl +1) is the number of states (x = [θ̂
> β̂>]>) to be estimated.
(b) Estimate the square root of the predicted error covariance
Sk|k−1 = Tria([Sk−1|k−1 SQ,k−1]), (4.3)
where SQ,k−1 denotes a square root of Q ∈ Rnx×nx such that Q = SQ,k−1S>Q,k−1.
Tria denotes any given triangularization algorithm.






2 is the cubature point-weight set. Sk−1|k−1 ∈ Rnx×nx is the
1Fig. 4.4 shows the detailed components of the SCKRNN1 and SCKRNN2
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SCKFRNN: Recurrent NN Trained by SCKF







Figure 4.3: Load forecaster configuration
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RNN SCKF






Figure 4.4: Block diagram of the training model
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previous estimated covariance matrix.







where, θ̂i,k−1 is the first nl rows of the Xi,k−1|k−1
3.

































[X1,k|k−1 − xk|k−1 X2,k|k−1 − xk|k−1
Xm,k|k−1 − xk|k−1]
(4.11)
(g) Estimate the square root of the innovations covariance matrix
Szz,k|k−1 = Tria([Υ̂k|k−1 SR,k]), (4.12)






. The superscript G is dropped to avoid
overloading the notations.
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(h) Estimate the cross-covariance matrix
Pxz,k|k−1 = κk|k−1Υ̂>k|k−1 (4.13)




(j) Estimate the updated state xk|k





(k) Estimate the corresponding error covariance
Sk|k = Tria([κk|k−1 −KkΥ̂k|k−1 KkSR,k]), (4.16)
After calculating the normalized predicted measurement for low high, and high frequent





max − uGmin) + uGmin (4.17)
In the training algorithm, the superscript G is dropped to avoid overloading the notations.
However, the training algorithm described above are used to train the two RNNs for the
LH and H component data set. For the prediction interval, this chapter uses Szz,k|k−1 as
we will see in the following subsection.
4.3.2 Prediction Interval Estimation
The overall variance estimate is derived in this subsection, to estimate prediction intervals
online for the PG. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the key idea is to use an overall estimate of
the variance obtained by adding together the three estimates from EKFNN , SCKFNN1 ,
and SCKFNN2 . This is because these components are orthogonal based on the wavelet
4/ is used to denote the matrix right division operator, which applies the back substitution algorithm
for an upper triangular matrix S and the forward substitution algorithm for a lower triangular matrix S
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theory. To obtain the individual variance estimates, the diagonal elements of the innovation
covariance (Szz,k|k−1) for H, LH, and LL components should be de-normalized individually.













k,LH , and σ
2
k,H are the variant of the L, LH and H
component data set. σ2k,LH , and σ
2
k,H are calculated as follows,
σ2k,G = (u
G
max − uGmin) diag(Szz,k|k−1) (4.19)








k) obtained from the proposed
VSTLF is used by the proposed SE, explained in Section 4.4, to forecast the distribution
system states. Forecasting the distribution system states can be used by the operator for
assessing the situation of the system or/and short term planing.
4.4 The Proposed Filter Scheme
The objective is to estimate the distribution system bus voltage magnitudes and angles of
the all buses of the distribution system network. The proposed SCKF technique recursively
updates the estimates using the previous estimated value from time k − 1 and the pseudo
measurements at time k to provide the final estimation of the bus voltage magnitudes and
angles at time instant k.
At time instant k , a measurement vector z ∈ Rnz is given. z ∈ Rnz is the vector
of pseudo-measurements provided by the proposed PG. nz is the total number of power
measurements. In compact notation, the set of measurement equations that include the
injected active and reactive power can be written as follows:
z = h (x) + v (4.20)
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where, h(x) is a non-linear function (power flow equation relating the injected power
to the voltage magnitudes and angles). v is the measurement noise, with a Gaussian
distribution.
x ∈ Rnx is is the vector of the state variables. nx is the total number of state variables.
The states that going to be estimated are the voltage magnitude and angle at each bus
x :=
[
|v1| · · · |vnx
2




The SCKF is developed using the least-squares method for the cubature Kalman gain
and matrix triangular factorization or triangularization for the covariance updates. The
least-squares method avoids the explicit computation of matrix inversion, whereas trian-
gularization essentially computes a triangular square-root factor of the covariance without
square rooting a squared-matrix form of the covariance. The SCKF essentially propagates
the square roots of the predictive and posterior error covariances and offers the following
benefits as compared to the CKF introduced in [92]:
1. Preservation of symmetry and positive (semi) definiteness [5]; and
2. Numerical accuracy enhancment [5].
Please note that to estimate the distribution system states x, this chapter uses the SCKF
algorithm described in Section 4.3, mutatis mutandis, using distribution system network
information (i.e,. instead of using the SCKF to estimate the weights of the RNN utilizing
the training data, here this chapter uses the pseudo measurement to estimate the distri-
bution system network states). The following points (1, 2, 3, and 4) will highlight the
changes made to the algorithm described in Section 4.3 due to the change of the model
(distribution system network rather than RNN).
At each time instant k, we perform the following:
First, the predicted state vector is computed, using the transition model presented in [119].
The steps for calculating the predicted state vector are as follows:
1. For each cubature point i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, calculate the following:
Xi,k−1|k−1 = Ŝk−1|k−1ξi + x̃k−1|k−1, (4.21)
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where, Ŝk−1|k−1 ∈ Rnx×nx is the previous estimated covariance matrix. Here, nx is
the number of distribution system network states, which were defined previously. As
one may notice from 4.21 that the predation model is highly dependent on the the
forecasting data. This is usually the case in all the prediction model available in
the literature since modeling the distribution system dynamic is very hard to obtain.
therefore, the enhancement of the accuracy of the forecast data can enhance the state
prediction accuracy.
2. compute the predicted state vector for each propagated cubature point i.
X̂i,k|k−1 = Xi,k−1|k−1 −H−1(Xi,k−1|k−1)(
Yk|k−1 − Yk−1|k−1
) (4.22)
This chapter uses the transition model presented in [119]. The matrix H−1 ∈
Rnx×nz = ∂h(x)/∂x is the Jacobin matrix evaluated at Xi,k−1|k−1. X̂i,k|k−1 ∈ Rnx
is the predicted state vector at cubature point i. Yk−1|k−1 and Yk|k−1 are respectively
the forecast injected power at time k − 1 and k.
3. Using X̂i,k|k−1, we compute,
a The predicted measurement as follows,
Ẑi,k|k−1 = h(X̂i,k|k−1), (4.23)
b The predicted states using 4.9.
4. Using X̂i,k|k−1 instead of Xi,k|k−1, and Ẑi,k|k−1 instead of Zi, the same steps described
in Section 4.3 are followed to obtain the estimated states.
4.4.1 Integration of the Proposed PG and SE
In this subsection, the integration (closed loop) between the proposed PG and the proposed
SE is explained. Two values are fed from the proposed PG to the proposed SE. One value









The yk is measurement point for the proposed SE. It also will be used as Yk|k−1, and the
previous forecast value (yk−1) will be used as Yk−1|k−1 in 4.22. The second value is the
variance which is calculated by 4.18. The variance of each measurement point at time k is
used to build the measurement covariance matrix R of the proposed SE.
4.5 Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, the results of the proposed forecasting aided state estimation algorithm is
demonstrated. First, the test system (IEEE 123-bus system) shown in Fig. 4.5, which is
used to evaluate the performance of the proposed SE, is described. Moreover, the load
characteristics used is also described. Second, the performance of the PG is compared
against the most commonly used VSTLF. Finally, the results of the proposed SE when
used with the proposed PG, against the results of the proposed SE when used with most
commonly used VSTLF, is compared. The underlying network topology is assumed to be
known a priori and fixed over the time duration of state estimation.
4.5.1 Test System and Load Characteristics
The IEEE 123-bus test system shown in Fig. 4.5 is used to evaluate the proposed forecasting
aided state estimation algorithm, as we will see in Section 4.5.3. Each bus is assumed to be
equipped with the proposed VSTLF to generate the measurement. In case of presence of
the real data the configuration used in the previous chapter can be used. The test network
is a 10 kV (where each MV node corresponds to a secondary transformer 10:0.4 kV) system
with a weakly-meshed structure. This network has a peak demand of 13.8 MW, which is
primarily made up of suburban/rural residential customers. The proposed algorithm were
implemented in MATLAB and time the execution of each iteration on a 3.6 GHz i7-7700
CPU. The best results were obtained using a feed forward neural network (FNN) comprised
of an input layer with 57 neurons (nu = 12 and nb = 45). nu inputs represent the last hour
load in five minute intervals (one for each five minute load value). One hidden layer with


























































































































Figure 4.5: IEEE 123-bus system
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the forecast hour load in five minute intervals (one for each five minute load value). The
best results were obtained using a RNN comprised the same structure of FNN except that
the RNN has an extra nl input neurons in the input layer as explained in Section 4.3.
4.5.2 Proposed Pseudo-measurement Generator Results and Eval-
uation
The training period is from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007, the validation is from
January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2008, and the test is from July 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008.
The data can be obtained from http://github.com/ldmbouge/vstlf. The mean average
percentage error (MAPE), mean absolute error (MAE), and estimated standard deviation
(ESD) are used to assess the performance of the proposed PG. Table 4.1, and 4.2 respec-
tively show the results of validation, and testing data for the proposed PG based FNN.
Table 4.1, and 4.2 compare the performance of the proposed PG based FNN (WNNHKF2)
with one proposed in [41] (WNNHKF1) based FNN. The proposed method in [41] used the
UKF as a training algorithm for both LH and H component data sets. Unlike our proposed
PG, the proposed algorithm in [41] uses the FNN. One can notice that, in terms of accuracy,
the best performance is obtained by the proposed PG. The proposed PG can enhance the
accuracy of forecasting by approximately 22% to 42%, compared to the proposed VSTLF
proposed in [41]. Accuracy enhancement in the forecasting data can potentially enhance
the accuracy of the estimated states as it will shown in 4.5.3.
Please note that the training, validation, and testing data sets used to perform the above
comparison are based on an aggregated load data available in http://github.com/ldmbouge/vstlf.
Table 4.3, and 4.4 respectively show the results of validation, and testing data for the pro-
posed PG based RNN. Table 4.3, and 4.4 compare the performance of the proposed PG
based RNN (WNNHKF4) with one proposed in [41] (WNNHKF3) based RNN. One can
notice that even if RNN with proposed training algorithm in [41] is used, our proposed
algorithm still show a better performance enhancement by approximately 22% to 42%.
Updating the type of NN from FNN to RNN can enhance the accuracy by 8 to 20 %.
From Table 4.1, and 4.2, one can notice that as the forecasting step increases (from 5-
to 60-min-ahead), the three metric values gradually increase as shown in Fig. 4.8. This
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Table 4.1: MAPES (%), MAES (MW), and ESD (MW) for WNNHKF1 and WNNHKF2
methods (based on validation data set) based FNN
WNNHKF1 WNNHKF2
Min. MAPE MAE ESD MAPE MAE ESD
5 0.12 17.22 22.79 0.09 13.90 18.55
10 0.17 25.48 35.60 0.13 18.62 29.41
15 0.21 31.64 49.29 0.16 24.36 37.50
20 0.26 37.70 55.62 0.20 28.03 43.33
25 0.29 42.98 61.19 0.22 32.10 46.12
30 0.33 50.12 75.70 0.25 39.60 56.30
35 0.36 54.16 81.43 0.28 40.70 61.70
40 0.40 60.38 97.32 0.31 47.50 75.44
45 0.44 65.98 102.60 0.34 49.81 77.30
50 0.48 72.12 107.60 0.37 53.53 83.10
55 0.51 76.52 112.53 0.39 58.92 85.64
60 0.55 82.76 130.08 0.42 62.73 101.16
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Table 4.2: MAPES (%), MAES (MW), and ESD (MW) for WNNHKF1 and WNNHKF2
methods (based on test data set) based FNN
WNNHKF1 WNNHKF2
Min. MAPE MAE ESD MAPE MAE ESD
5 0.13 19.39 25.68 0.10 15.93 20.77
10 0.18 27.33 38.28 0.14 20.04 28.48
15 0.22 32.86 51.60 0.17 26.30 39.73
20 0.26 39.01 57.40 0.21 30.04 46.20
25 0.30 44.87 62.04 0.23 36.55 46.77
30 0.34 50.97 76.11 0.26 36.25 59.61
35 0.38 56.93 81.14 0.29 43.84 61.48
40 0.42 63.30 96.58 0.32 47.74 75.37
45 0.46 69.01 100.99 0.35 54.14 76.76
50 0.50 75.46 105.52 0.39 58.90 83.25
55 0.54 81.09 110.29 0.43 62.44 84.92
60 0.58 87.43 128.36 0.46 66.32 98.84
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Table 4.3: MAPES (%), MAES (MW), and ESD (MW) for WNNHKF3 and WNNHKF4
methods (based on validation data set) based RNN
WNNHKF3 WNNHKF4
Min. MAPE MAE ESD MAPE MAE ESD
5 0.11 16.79 21.90 0.08 12.54 17.27
10 0.16 24.37 32.65 0.12 17.97 23.85
15 0.19 29.01 43.20 0.14 20.20 33.92
20 0.24 34.57 50.00 0.17 24.26 38.27
25 0.27 36.41 55.11 0.19 29.80 40.03
30 0.31 44.96 68.42 0.22 31.58 51.72
35 0.33 47.67 75.67 0.24 37.29 52.57
40 0.37 53.37 88.24 0.27 41.96 66.20
45 0.40 61.50 93.08 0.30 45.21 67.74
50 0.44 65.13 98.67 0.32 49.32 72.10
55 0.47 71.17 104.19 0.34 50.27 72.40
60 0.50 73.89 117.28 0.37 55.45 88.16
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Table 4.4: MAPES (%), MAES (MW), and ESD (MW) for WNNHKF3 and WNNHKF4
methods (based on test data set) based RNN
WNNHKF3 WNNHKF4
Min. MAPE MAE ESD MAPE MAE ESD
5 0.11 17.80 22.55 0.09 14.43 18.21
10 0.17 26.06 34.10 0.12 19.31 26.65
15 0.20 31.13 45.32 0.15 22.01 34.57
20 0.24 33.77 52.64 0.17 27.14 38.96
25 0.28 40.15 55.89 0.20 31.06 42.57
30 0.31 44.74 70.79 0.23 34.15 51.90
35 0.35 51.21 75.41 0.26 39.14 55.36
40 0.39 57.05 87.56 0.28 43.41 66.71
45 0.42 61.28 93.61 0.31 45.24 68.66
50 0.46 66.20 96.76 0.34 51.56 70.70
55 0.50 72.36 101.14 0.36 53.33 73.90
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Figure 4.7: MAPE values for the testing data
is because the uncertainty expands as the forecasting step increases. The metric values
in Table 4.1 (using validation data), are very close to the ones in 4.2 (using test data).
This indicates that WNNHKF1 and WNNHKF2 parameters are properly selected. All
the metric values quantify forecasting accuracy in a certain way, with the last one directly
related to PIs. One can notice from Table 4.1, and 4.2, that the ESDs have values from 22
MW to 131 MW, and ISO-NEs system load data have values around 15000 MW as shown
in Fig. 4.6.
4.5.3 The Proposed State Estimator Results and Evaluation
This chapter assumes that the sampling period T = 5 min. The load data for each bus
in medium voltage distribution system used to assess the proposed SE was obtained
by modifying the aggregated load used in the previous section. Since the load data
used in the previous section is for aggregated load at transmission level, the data is
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scaled down by dividing by 160, 000 to be appropriate for the distribution system in the
medium voltage level. This modification is reasonable as when the modified load curve
is compared with typical load of point in medium voltage distribution system available
in http://smarthg.di.uniroma1.it/test-beds-data-anlytics-charts/, one can notice that the
two aforementioned curves have the same shape features 5. Since no recorded data were
available for the reactive power at each MV node, the measured reactive power demand
at the primary transformer was used to scale reactive power demands at each MV node so
that the total reactive power demand matches the recorded value at the primary. As would
be expected for an MV network serving mainly residential load, power factors are generally
very close to unity, but there was some variation between 0.8 and 1.0, particularly during
the early morning hours. The load flow results at each time instant using true testing data
values are calculated and used as a benchmark to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed
algorithms. To evaluate the accuracy of the proposed SEs, several tests were performed
using the test data. For each bus, a set of sequential true data samples is generated using
the test data as follows,
zi ∼ N (µ, σ1) (4.25)
where zi is the true value of the load point at bus i. µ is the true value obtained from the
test data set and σ1 equal to 0.001.
It is worth noting that in practical each bus is equipped with the proposed VSTLF to
generate the measurements. The RNN used in the proposed VSTLF is trained using the
historical data available at that particular bus. The training stage should be done every
two or three months as the load behavior is expected to change after that period. The
main advantage of the RNN is that can be trained using less data compared to FNN.
The Gaussian pseudo-measurements with mean zi and σ equivalent to the correspond-
ing error of the proposed forecasting algorithm and the forecasting algorithm proposed
in [41].
5We were not able to get real typical data for a point in the distribution system, this is why that mild
modification is made. The main contribution in this chapter is proposing the new forecasting algorithm and
SE algorithm and integrating the two proposed algorithms. However, the proposed forecasting algorithm
can work more efficiently for data for a point in the distribution system, as this load data has more higher
frequency component
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The maximum values of the relative errors in voltage magnitudes (MRE) is used to





where, V̂i is the estimated voltage magnitude at bus i, Vi is the true value.
Table 4.5 shows the comparison between the proposed SE when used with the proposed
PG (Case 2), and the results of the proposed SE when used with one proposed in [41]










where, |ZOl| represents the cardinality of the IEEE 123-bus system (i.e., the number of




where Mc is the number of the test data.
Table 4.5 shows the comparison between case 1 (the proposed SE when used with one
proposed method in [41]) and case 2 (the proposed SE, when used with the proposed
PG). Case 2 has a performance enhancement of approximately 4% to 7%, compared to the
results of the case 1.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a forecasting aided state estimation algorithm which allows the
operator to forecast the system states for a one hour horizon in five minute intervals.
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Table 4.5: Performance comparison between WNNHKF1 and WNNHKF4 method (based
on test data set)
CASE1 CASE2
Min. MREmax MREave MREmax MREave
5 0.52× 10−3 0.45× 10−3 0.34× 10−3 0.29× 10−3
10 0.72× 10−3 0.62× 10−3 0.47× 10−3 0.38× 10−3
15 0.87× 10−3 0.75× 10−3 0.58× 10−3 0.44× 10−3
20 1.03× 10−3 0.93× 10−3 0.69× 10−3 0.57× 10−3
25 1.19× 10−3 1.05× 10−3 0.79× 10−3 0.68× 10−3
30 1.35× 10−3 1.18× 10−3 0.90× 10−3 0.82× 10−3
35 1.51× 10−3 1.34× 10−3 1.01× 10−3 0.94× 10−3
40 1.66× 10−3 1.53× 10−3 1.11× 10−3 1.01× 10−3
45 1.82× 10−3 1.71× 10−3 1.22× 10−3 1.07× 10−3
50 2.00× 10−3 1.92× 10−3 1.32× 10−3 1.13× 10−3
55 2.14× 10−3 2.05× 10−3 1.43× 10−3 1.23× 10−3
60 2.30× 10−3 2.11× 10−3 1.54× 10−3 1.39× 10−3
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Figure 4.8: MREmax values for the testing data. CASE1 is based on load forecaster trained
by UKF, while CASE2 is load forecaster trained by SCKF (the proposed algorithm) .
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The PG is designed utilizing the strength of the RNN. Three RNNs are trained using
three components of the data set which are low frequency, low-high frequency and high
frequency data set. The three components of the data set are obtained using the wavelet
decomposer. The training algorithm for the RNN with low frequency data set is performed
using the EKF as the low frequency data set shows a nearly linear relationship. The training
algorithm for the RNN with low-high and high frequency data set is performed using the
SCKF as the low-high, and high frequent data set shows a non-linear relationship. This
chapter compares the results of the proposed SE when used with the proposed PG, against
the results of the proposed SE when used with other commonly used VSTLF. The proposed
SE when used with the proposed PG were applied to an IEEE 123-bus system, and the
simulation results demonstrated a superior performance in terms of accuracy compared to
the proposed SE when used with other commonly used VSTLF.
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Chapter 5
Mitigation of Cyber-Physical Attacks
in Multi-Area Automatic Generation
Control
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter new attack resilient scheme for single and multi-area AGC systems is devel-
oped. The proposed approach detects and identifies the sensors under attack on single area
AGC systems leveraging the results presented in [29] and [78]. Once an attack has been
identified, a simple switching scheme is employed to ensure that the AGC feedback loop
continues to make its control decisions using uncompromised sensor data. We also charac-
terize the degree of sensor redundancy needed in order to implement a robust solution and
ensure uninterrupted service. The above ideas is extended to a multi-area AGC framework
where the frequency and tie-line sensors may be attacked. s-sparse observability analysis
is provided for AGC in single area and multi-area power networks. A numerical simula-
tions demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed approach in detecting and mitigating




x1 Steam valve position command.






e[k] Attack on the sensors at time t = kT
x(kT ) Value of the state at time kT
xc[k] Controller state at time kT
T Sampling period
y Information available for feedback
E∗[k] Actual attack vector
∆Pij Deviation from the scheduled exchanges between areas i and j
∆ωi Deviation from the from the nominal frequency value for area i
76
5.3 Problem Formulation for a Single AGC
We start by deriving a continuous-time state-space representation of the linearised model
of a single area AGC system. The conventional control architecture based on the linearised
model is used. The state-space variable x1 := ∆Pv equals the steam valve position com-
mand. The variable x2 equals ∆Pm, the change in mechanical power. Finally, the state x3
equals the frequency change ∆ω of the power system network. The state vector of the AGC
system is x := (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3. The exogenous signals are the control input u(t) which
physically represents the generation difference and the disturbance d(t) which physically
represents load change ∆PL(t). With these definitions the linearised AGC dynamics can
be expressed in state-space form as
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + Ed(t). (5.1)
Following [86], the matrices in (5.1) are given by
A =
−1/τg 0 01/τT −1/τT 0
0 1/2H −D/2H








. The physical constant H is the total generator inertia, τg is
the governor time constant, τT is the turbine time constant and D is the load damping
constant. The signal available for feedback is x3(t) which is also the variable that must be
regulated. Therefore, the system output is taken to be




x(t) + w(t) (5.3)
where w ∈ R represents measurement noise and is assumed to take values in a known
compact subset of the output space R. In other words, there exists a known constant
δw > 0 such that for all t ≥ 0, |w(t)| ≤ δw. Upon receiving the frequency measurement,
the controller adjusts the valve position to maintain the network frequency at its nominal
value. A commonly used control law is proportional-integral (PI) control [86] given by
u(t) = KPy(t) + KI
∫ t
0
y(τ) dτ , where KP , KI are, respectively, the proportional and
integral gains. It is common to express the proportional gain as KP = 1/R, where R
represents the droop constant.
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5.3.1 Discrete-time Model
In practice, the controller is often designed for the continuous-time dynamics (5.1), (5.3)
and then descritized for implementation. Assuming an ideal sample and an ideal zero-order
hold at a sampling period of T > 0 seconds, and further assuming that d(t) = ∆PL(t), and
w(t) are constant over a sampling period, the AGC evolves in discrete time according to
the dynamics,
x[k + 1] = Adx[k] +Bdu[k] + Edd[k]
y[k] = Cdx[k] + w[k]
(5.4)
where x[k] := x(kT ) is the value of the state at time kT , k ∈ Z. Similarly y[k] := y(kT )
, d[k] := d(kT ), w[k] := w(kT ). The matrices in (5.4) are given by Ad = e
AT , Bd =∫ T
0
eAτB dτ , Ed =
∫ T
0
eAτE dτ and Cd = C. We assume that the sampling isn’t pathological
so that the pairs (Ad, Bd), (Cd, Ad) remain, respectively, controllable and observable. The
discretized PI controller in state-space form is given by
xc[k + 1] = xc[k] + Ty[k]
u[k] = KPy[k] +KIxc[k]
(5.5)
where xc[k] is the controller state at time kT . During normal operation, thanks to the
integral action in the controller, the single area AGC system is able to reject piecewise
constant disturbances while keeping the system frequency at its nominal value.
5.3.2 Sensor Redundancy and Attack Model
As mentioned in the introduction, in this chapter the AGC is assumed to be equipped
with more than one frequency sensor. This redundancy will be used to detect cyber-
physical attacks and take appropriate control action. As such, we no longer assume that
the measured output is 1-dimensional as in (5.4), but rather that there are p frequency
sensors. Let y ∈ Rp denote the information available for feedback using redundant sensors.
As in the single output case (5.4), each sensor is assumed to be corrupted by measurement
noise which, with mild abuse of notation, we denote as a vector w ∈ Rp. We continue to
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assume that there is a known constant δw > 0 such that
1 for all k ∈ Z, ‖w[k]‖∞ ≤ δw.
To model a cyber-physical attack, we let e ∈ Rp denote an attack vector so that e[k]
represents an attack on the sensors at time t = kT . This attack vector appears as an
additive disturbance to the measured variables so that the AGC model, with redundant
measurements and attacks, is given by
x[k + 1] = Adx[k] +Bdu[k] + Edd[k]
y[k] = Cx[k] + w[k] + e[k]
(5.6)
where C := (1p ⊗ Cd), ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and 1p ∈ Rp is the vector of all
ones. The first problem considered in this chapter, under the assumption that we have
sufficient redundancy in the sensors, is to identify which sensors have been corrupted by
an attack and then use the non-attacked measurements as inputs to the control law (5.5)
in order to ensure reliable operation of the AGC. In Section 5.6 we extend this idea to
multi-area automatic generation control.
5.4 Attack Detection
As stated in the introduction, we leverage the results in [29] and [78] to detect attacks on
AGC systems. In this section, we summarize how the attack detection scheme works in the
context of an AGC. We start by determining the maximum number of sensors that can be
simultaneously attacked while still retaining the ability to detect the attacks when there
is no noise and no load change. To do this we need some notation. If Np := {1, . . . , p} and
K ⊆ Np, then Kc := Np\K denotes the complement of K in Np. Let PK : Rp → R|K| be the
linear map which takes a vector y ∈ Rp and removes the rows in Kc.
Definition 5.4.1 ([96]). A pair (C, A) is s-sparse observable if, for every set K ⊂ Np
of cardinality s, the pair (PKcC, A) is observable.
We assume that the number of compromised sensors in (5.6) is less than or equal to
qmax, the maximum number of sensors for which the system’s state can be recovered when
there is no noise and no load changes.
1If x ∈ Rn, then ‖x‖∞ = max {|x1|, . . . , |xn|}.
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Table 5.1: Number of frequency sensors p and maximum number of attacked sensors qmax.
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
qmax 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
Lemma 5.4.2 ([29]). The maximum number qmax of attacked sensors for which the state
of (5.6) can be recovered when there is no noise and no disturbance equals the largest s ∈ Np
for which the pair (C, Ad) is 2s-sparse observable.
From this lemma we can immediately quantify the minimum degree of redundancy
needed for frequency control of an AGC.
Proposition 5.4.3. The maximum number of sensors which can be attacked while retaining
the ability to estimate the state of the single AGC system when there is no noise and no
load changes equals b(p− 1)/2c.
Proof. Observe that the pair (C,Ad) is observable. Therefore the pair (PKcC, Ad) is ob-
servable as long as PKc isn’t equal to the zero map, i.e., Kc 6= ∅. This in turn implies that
|K| ≤ p− 1. Setting 2qmax = |K| and solving for qmax gives the desired result.
Table 5.1 gives an interpretation of Proposition 5.4.3. Given an expected maximal
number of sensors qmax that can be attacked, we can choose the number of frequency
sensors that the AGC should be equipped with. The criteria to define the redundancy of
sensors is based on an optimal sensor cost that gives a highest possible robustness.
5.4.1 Identifying Attacked Sensors
The support of the attack vector e at time k is supp (e[k]) = {i ∈ Np : ei[k] 6= 0}, where ei
is the ith component of e. The symbol ‖e[k]‖0 = | supp (e[k])| denotes the number of non-
zero entries in the vector e[k]. Let K :=
⋃
k∈Z supp (e[k]) and, in light of Proposition 5.4.3,
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we assume throughout that2 |K| ≤ qmax = b(p − 1)/2c. To identify the sensors that have
been attacked we collect the last N output measurements and solve an MILP at every
time step. The value used for N is naturally taken to be equal to the dimension of the
system’s state space. Let ỹi[k] :=
[
Piỹ[k −N + 1]> · · · Piỹ[k]>
]>
∈ RN be the vector
which maintains the last N sensor measurements from sensor i ∈ Np, compensated for the
inputs applied during this interval, i.e,




CAjdBdu[n− j − 1],
where n ∈ {k −N + 2, . . . , k} .Define, for output i ∈ Np, Oi :=
[
PiC PiCA · · · PiCAN−1
]>
∈
RN×n and let ei[k] :=
[
ei[k −N + 1]> · · · ei[k]>
]>
∈ RN . The vector ei represents
the attack values injected into sensor i over the last N time steps. Similarly, define
wi[k] :=
[
wi[k −N + 1]> · · · wi[k]>
]>
∈ RN as the list of measurement noise over the
last N time steps at sensor i. Then we can express the last N measurements obtained from
output i ∈ Np as
ỹi[k] = Oix[k −N ] + ei[k] + wi[k]. (5.7)
Following [79], in this expression we have absorbed the effect of the disturbance d into the
measurement noise terms and therefore, if necessary, increasing δw so that ‖w[k]‖∞ ≤ δw
continues to hold. Since the open-loop matrix (5.2) is Hurwitz, this approach isn’t overly














> · · ·wp[k]>
]>
.
Each of these are pN -dimensional real vectors. Finally, define O :=
[
O>1 · · · O>p
]>
∈
RpN×n so we can compactly write
Y[k] = Ox[k −N ] + E[k] + W[k]. (5.8)
2This assumption can be weakened to state that, over any time interval of length N , the number of
attacked sensors is less than qmax.
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By assumption, the measurement noise is uniformly bounded ‖w[k]‖∞ ≤ δw and so the
vector W[k] is restricted to the compact ‘box’ Ω := [−δw, δw]pN ⊂ RpN .










where I(·) denotes the indicator function. The number ‖E[k]‖2,0 equals the number of
sensors that have been attacked over the last N time steps while ‖E[k]‖2,1 represents the





subject to: Y[k]−Ox[k −N ] + E[k] = W[k]
W ∈ Ω.
M
In the absence of noise, i.e., when Ω = 0 ∈ RpN , if the number of attacked sensors
|K| is less than or equal to qmax = b(p− 1)/2c, then the values of the minimizing decision
variables for Problem 1 are the state x[k −N ] and the actual attack vector E∗[k] [29]. In
the presence of noise, the minimizing variables aren’t necessarily (x[k −N ],E∗[k]).
Problem 1 involves combinatorial optimization and can be solved using MILP solvers.
However, solving this problem is NP–hard in the general case which limits its use to
smaller size systems. We will see that, since our AGC system with n = 3 state, N = 3 time
steps and p = 3 frequency sensors, solving Problem 1 is feasible in real-time applications.









This problem can be solved efficiently but is only effective at detecting relatively large
attacks.
5.4.2 Performance
In [78], the authors provide a bound on the error between the true value of x[k −N ] and
its estimated value for both of the aforementioned optimization problems. Let (x̃2,0, Ẽ2,0)
be the minimizing values for the decision variables for Problem 1 and let (x̃2,1, Ẽ2,1) be the
minimizing values for the decision variables for Problem 2. Let E∗ denote the true attack
vector over the last N time steps. Define the errors for Problem 1 ∆x2,0 := x̃2,0−x[k−N ],
∆E2,0 := Ẽ2,0 − E∗ as well as the errors ∆x2,1 := x̃2,1 − x[k − N ], ∆E2,1 := Ẽ2,1 − E∗ the
errors for Problem 2. By first computing an error bound on ∆x2,0 and ∆x2,1, one can prove






where ẽj[k] is the jth block vector in either Ẽ2,0 (when i = 0) or Ẽ2,1 (when i = 1), then
sensor j has been attacked over the last N time steps. In this chapter we use the integer
decision variable E in Problem 1 as our estimate of which sensors were attacked over the
last N time steps. In other words, we will say that sensor j has been attacked over the
last N times steps if
I(‖ẽj[k]‖2 > 0) (5.11)
While there is no guarantee that the policy (5.11) will correctly detect the attacked sen-
sor, simulations suggest that this approach is able to identify sensors under attack even
when the attacks are small in magnitude (stealthy). In the case where, due to computa-
tional efficiency considerations, one instead solves Problem 2, the policy (5.10) (using D1j )
guarantees no false positive attack detections if the sufficient condition [78, Eqn. (29)]] is
satisfied. Unfortunately, it can be shown using the parameters in Table 5.2 that the single
AGC system does not satisfy the aforementioned sufficient condition. Therefore, the pol-
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Table 5.2: AGC parameters in single area system [101]
D R KI H(s) τg(s) τT (s)
0.8 0.05 7 5 0.2 0.5
icy (5.10) is neither reliable nor effective for stealthy attack3. Since the bound computed
in [78] is very conservative, due to several applications of the triangular inequality in its
derivation, a huge range of stealthy attacks elude the proposed attack detector.
5.5 Attack Mitigation
At each time step k, the proposed attack mitigation strategy for a single AGC system with
p ≥ 3 frequency sensors is the as follows.
1. Fix N ≥ 3 to be the number of steps over which we aim to detect attacks. The lower
bound of 3 comes from the dimension of the AGC’s state-space.
2. If k ≥ N − 1, solve the mixed integer linear program Problem 1. Let Ẽ2,0[k] denote
the value of the decision variable returned by the solver.
3. Set
s[k] := 1p −
[
I(‖ẽ1[k]‖2 > 0) . . . I(‖ẽp[k]‖2 > 0)
]>
where ẽj[k] is the jth block vector in Ẽ2,0[k]. The ith component of s[k] is 1 if we
haven’t detected an attack on sensor i over the last N time steps. Otherwise the ith
component equals zero.






3Based on the parameters of the single AGC system shown in Table 5.2 Dẽ
l0





5. Update the discretized PI control signal
xc[k + 1] = xc[k] + TyFB[k]
u[k] = KPyFB[k] +KIxc[k]
(5.13)
and return to Step 2 at the next sample instant.
5.6 Extension to Multi-area AGC Systems
Conventional multi-area AGC is based upon tie-line bias control where each area tends to
reduce the area control error (ACE) to zero [86].
Consider a power network with n areas represented as a set of vertices Nn = {1, . . . , n}
and overhead or underground lines (tie- lines) represented by a set of edges E ⊆ V × V.
The neighbors of area i are defined as Ni := {j ∈ Nn : (i, j) ∈ E}. The neighbours of area
i are simply the areas connected to it via tie-lines. If (i, j) ∈ E, then ∆Pij represents a
deviation from the scheduled exchanges between areas i and j. The variable ∆ωi represents
the deviation from the nominal frequency value for area i. With this notation, the area
control error for area i consists of a linear combination of frequency and its neighboring
tie-line error ACEi := βi∆ωi +
∑
j∈Ni ∆Pij. The area bias βi determines the amount of
interaction during a disturbance in the neighboring areas. To model the interconnection
with its neighbors, we modify the single AGC continuous-time model (5.1) as follows. For
simplicity assume that all the AGCs have the same physical constants. Let ri := |Ni| and
ni := 3 + ri. The three comes from the original state variables in (5.1) and the |Ni| extra
states come from the interconnections. The model of AGC i in the multi-area AGC setup
is then given by
ẋi(t) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t) + Eidi(t) (5.14)




























where A, B, E are the same matrices as in the single AGC system (5.1). The constant
Ps is the synchronizing power coefficient, and equals the slope of the power angle curve
at the initial operating angle. The first three state variables are the same as before while
the last ri = |Ni| state variables are ∆Pij, i.e., the deviation from the scheduled exchanges
between areas i and j where j ∈ Ni. The control signal ui(t) is the same as in the single
AGC model and the disturbance vector di(t) = (∆PL(t),∆ωj1(t), . . . ,∆ωjri (t)) is the load
change on AGC i followed by the frequency change of each of the AGC’s neighbors.
In the conventional setup, AGC i has access to its own frequency measurement ∆ωi as
well as ∆Pij for each j ∈ Ni. Therefore the information available for feedback is given by








Once again the measurement noise wi(t) is assumed to be bounded in a known compact





βi 1 · · · 1
]
yi(τ)dτ where yi,1 is the first component of yi, i.e., AGC i’s own
frequency measurement. The scalers KP,i, KI,i are, respectively, the proportional and
integral gains of AGC i. Satisfactory performance is achieved by setting βi = KP,i+Di [86]
5.6.1 Proposed Attack-resilient State Estimation for the Multi
Areas AGC System
Descretize the continuous time model (5.14), (5.16) of AGC i in the same manner as (5.6).
The attack vector appears as an additive disturbance to the measured variables so that
the AGC i model with redundant measurements and attacks is given by
xi[k + 1] = Aidxi[k] +Bidui[k] + Eiddi[k]





1p1 ⊗ Ci,1 1p2 ⊗ Ci,2 ·· 1pri+1 ⊗ Ci,ri+1
]
The first p1 rows in Ci represent
the redundant frequency measurements, and 1pj+1 ⊗Ci,j+1 , where j ∈ {1, ··, ri}, represent
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jth tie-line redundant measurements. Once again the sampling is assumed to be non-
pathological. We make the mild assumption that all interconnected AGCs are sampled at
the same rate T > 0 and that all sample and hold operators in the network are synchronised.
The discretized PI controller for AGC i in state-space form is
xc,i[k + 1] = xc,i[k] + Tyi[k]
ui[k] = KP,iyi,1[k] +KI,i
[




The first issue considered in this section, under the assumption that we have sufficient
redundancy in the sensors, is to identify which sensors have been corrupted by an attack
and then use the non-attacked measurements as inputs to the control law (5.19). To under-
stand how many attacks can tolerated, we need to understand the s-sparse observability
of (5.14), (5.16).
Proposition 5.6.1. The pair (PKCi, Ai), where Ai is given in (5.15), Ci is given by (5.17)
and K ⊆ Nri+1, is observable if, and only if
(i) K 6= ∅, and
(ii) |K ∩ {2, . . . , ri + 1}| ≥ ri − 1.
The conditions of this proposition can be intuitively interpreted as saying that AGC i
is observable so long as it’s only missing information from at most one of its neighbours.
Proof. We start by understanding the structure of the unobservable subspace of the pair
(Ci, Ai). To simplify notation let cj denote the jth row of Ci. Then Ker c1 ⊆ Ker cjAi for
j ≥ 2. This can be shown by noting that cjAi = c1 It follows that Ker(c1Ak−1i ) ⊆ Ker(cjAki )

















= KerCi ∩Ker (c1Ai) ∩ · · · ∩Ker (c1Ani−1i )
where we’ve used Ker(c1A
k−1
i ) ⊆ Ker(cjAki ) for k ≥ 1 and 2 ≤ j ≤ ri + 1 to obtain the last






N(c1,Ai) is the unobservable subspace of (c1, Ai). We claim that the dimension of N(c1,Ai)
equals ni − 4 = ri − 1. To show this, compute the first 5 rows of the observability matrix





cA2 + γ2c γ31
>
ri









The various constants γi in this matrix are γ1 = 1/(2H), γ2 = riPsγ1, γ3 = γ1cAc
>,
γ4 = riγ3, γ5 = γ1c (A
2 + γ2I) c
>, γ6 = riPsγ3, γ7 = riPsγ5, γ8 = γ1c (A
3 + γ2Aγ2I) c
>.
γ1 = 1/(2H), γ2 = riPsγ1
γ3 = γ1cAc
>, γ4 = riγ3
γ5 = γ1c (A
2 + γ2I) c
>, γ6 = riPsγ3
γ7 = riPsγ5, γ8 = γ1c (A
3 + γ2Aγ2I) c
>.
Performing elementary row reduction on this matrix, then, using the Cayley-Hamilton























The coefficient γ9 is guaranteed to be positive because cA
2c>/(2H) is positive and, since
A is Hurwitz, the coefficients of its characteristic polynomial are all positive. Since (c, A)
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is observable (cf. Section 5.4), we conclude that this matrix has rank 4 and that the
dimension of N(c1,Ai) equals ni − 4 = ri − 1 as claimed. We can therefore conclude that
Ni = {0}, i.e., (Ci, Ai) is observable, if and only if there are ri − 1 tie-line measurements.
This is precisely condition (ii) of the proposition statement while condition (i) ensures that
the frequency sensor is measured in the case when the AGC only has one neighbor.
Corollary 5.6.2. For ri = 1, the maximum number of sensors which can be attacked
when there is no noise and no disturbances while retaining the ability to estimate the state
of the AGC i equals b(p1 + p2 − 1)/2c.
Proof. Based on Proposition 5.6.1, for any sensor j ∈ Np1+p2 observe that the pair (PjCi, Aid)
is observable. Therefore the pair (PKcCi, A) is observable as long as PKc isn’t equal to the
zero map, i.e., Kc 6= ∅. This in turn implies that |K| ≤ p1 + p2 − 1. Setting 2qmax = |K|
and solving for qmax gives the desired result.
Before, introducing Corollary 5.6.3, for sake of clarity and without loss of generality,
assume that the tie-line measurements pj+1 are ordered in increasing manner, where p2 ≤
p3 ≤ · · · ≤ pri+1.
Corollary 5.6.3. For ri ≥ 2, the maximum number of sensors which can be attacked when
there is no noise and no disturbances while retaining the ability to estimate the state of the
AGC i equals b(p2 + p3 − 1)/2c.
Proof. Based on Proposition 5.6.1, observe that the pair (Ci, Ai) is observable as long as
the number of available tie-line measurements is at least equal to ri − 1. Therefore the
pair (PKcCi, A) is observable as long as the cardinality of K is less than p2 + p3. Setting
2qmax = |K| and solving for qmax gives the desired result.
We now present the attack mitigation strategy for AGC in multi-area power network.
To understand the strategy, note that each AGC in the network solves it’s own version of
Problem 1, mutatis mutandis, using its own model information. At each time step k, the



































Figure 5.1: The scheme of the multi-area AGC system with the proposed algorithm.
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1. Fix N ≥ 3 + ri to be the number of steps over which we aim to detect attacks. The
lower bound of 3 + ri comes from the dimension of the AGC’s state-space.
2. If k ≥ N − 1, solve the mixed integer linear program Problem 1. Let Ẽ2,0[k] denote
the value of the decision variable returned by the solver.
3. For the redundant measurements, we recursively define ρ0 := 0, ρj := ρj−1 + pj for








. . . I
(




where ẽj[k] is the jth block vector in Ẽ2,0[k]. The ith component of sj[k] is 1 if
we haven’t detected an attack on sensor i over the last N time steps, where j ∈
{1, ··, ri + 1} . Otherwise the ith component equals zero.
4. Take the average of the un-attacked sensor readings as the information available for
feedback
yFBi[k] := Myi[k]. (5.21)












5. Update the discretized PI control signal








where, yFBi,1[k] is the first element in yFBi[k] and return to Step 2 at the next sample
instant.
Of course, for this strategy to be feasible for real-time control of the AGC i, one must
be able to solve Problem 1 within the scheduling constraints of the embedded controller.
The real-time constraint becomes too restrictive as the number of neighbours increases.
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However, we show that for the use of a fully connected, 3 AGC system, Problem 1 can be
solved in real-time. Most existing interconnected systems [48, 112] consist of at most three
tie lines. This is due to economic and technical constraints discussed in [1, 31]. Therefore,
from a practical point of view, the proposed algorithm can be applied to most multi-AGC
systems in existence.
5.7 Simulation Results
We present and illustrate the simulation results of the proposed algorithm compared with
legacy AGC in the single and three-area system. The parameters used in simulation are
given, respectively, in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. The parameters are in per unit on a common
1000 MVA base. We implement the proposed algorithm in MATLAB and time the ex-
ecution of each iteration on a 3.6 GHz i7-7700 CPU. We use CVX solver (MOSEK) for
solving Problem 1. We begin with the AGC in the single area with sampling period T =
0.1 s. For simulation purposes, we consider the following attack signal on sensor i
ei(k) =

a(k − k1r + 1), for, k1r ≤ k ≤ k2r (ramp)
a, for, k1c ≤ k ≤ k2c (constant)
af(k), for, k1p ≤ k ≤ k2p (pulse)
a ∼ N (µ, σ), for, k1k ≤ k ≤ k2k (random)
0 otherwise
(5.24)
where, f(k), is a pulse wave with a 50 % duty cycle and period 6T . The parameters µ,
σ are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution.
The parameter a controls the “size” of the attack signal. Informally, when a is small
we call the attacks “stealthy”. The load change ∆PL is generated by scaling the steady
state load by zero-mean Gaussian random variable of standard deviation 0.05 per unit
(p.u.). We assume that the number of sensors available is equal to 3 (p = 3), so based
on Proposition 5.4.3, qmax is equal to one. Fig. 5.2 shows the frequency deviation of the
grid in Hz against time (kT ) in seconds. Fig. 5.2 shows the frequency deviation of the
grid with and without the proposed algorithm, and compared with the original frequency
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deviation. Several kinds of attacks are applied during the first and the second shaded area
to simulate the unpredictable behaviour of the attacker. For the stealthy attacks during
the first shaded area, ramp, pulse, constant, and random signal have been initiated at
k1r = 40, k
1
p = 150, k
1
c = 200, and k
1
k = 250 respectively. The ramp attack with a = −0.005
lasts for 8.6 seconds (k2r = 125). The pulse attack with a = −0.2 lasts for 3.6 seconds
(k2p = 185). The constant with a = −0.2, and random with µ = −0.2, σ = 0.1, attack
lasts for 2.6 seconds (k2c = 235, and k
2
k = 285). When the attacker is applying stealthy
attacks (first shaded area), the frequency goes slightly above the true grid frequency value.
This means that the generation is unnecessarily above the demand. Consequently, the grid
is operated uneconomically, causing some profit loss to the owner. In the second shaded
area, the ramp attack with a = 0.05 is launched again at 30 seconds (k1r = 300). The
aim of this attack is to cause high deviation from the nominal frequency and trigger the
remedial actions. The thresholds εL and εU shown in Fig. 5.2 are set to those for triggering
remedial actions. We use εL = −0.5 Hz and εU = 0.5 Hz [104]. As shown in Fig. 5.2, the
attacker manipulates the AGC system to make the grid frequency leave the safety region
at time 37.5 s, while the AGC system equipped with proposed algorithm follows the not
attacked frequency deviation. The proposed algorithm is able to detect and identify the
sensors under attack in 0.07 s (i.e., Problem 1 is solved using MOSEK in 0.07 s). The
proposed algorithm is able to detect the attack of size 0.02 Hz (i.e., a = 0.02) once the
attack is launched. Smaller sizes can be detected after 0.3 to 0.5 second. The proposed
algorithm is able to detect and identify the sensors under attack even in the case of sudden
load change or a high load fluctuation i.e., the proposed algorithm is able to detect and
identify the sensors under attack when the load change ∆PL is generated by scaling the
highly fluctuated load by zero-mean Gaussian random variable with a standard deviation
of 0.2 p.u.
Next, we test the AGC equipped with the proposed algorithm in a three-area configu-
ration under various types of coordinated attacks with sampling period T = 0.1s. For each
AGC i, we assume that the number of frequency sensors available is equal to 3 (p1 = 3),
the number of first tie-line sensors available is equal to 3 (p2 = 3), and the number of
second tie-line sensors available is equal to 4 (p3 = 4). Based on Corollary 5.6.3, the maxi-
mum number of sensor that can be attacked is equal to 3 (qmax = 3), however, simulations
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Under attack with the proposed algorithm









Figure 5.2: The grid frequency deviation where the system is under stealthy attack (first
shaded region) and under severe attack (second shaded region)
Table 5.3: System parameters [101]
Area ’i ’ D R β Ki H(s) τg(s) τT (s)
Area 1 0.8 0.05 20.8 0.5 5 0.2 0.5
Area 2 0.9 0.0625 16.9 0.5 4 0.3 0.6
Area 3 0.9 0.0625 16.9 0.5 4 0.3 0.6
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suggest that (qmax = 2). This is due to the presence of noise and load disturbance. The
proposed algorithm is able to detect and identify the tie-line sensors under attack even in
the case of sudden load change or a high load fluctuation, while frequency sensors under
attack can only be detected during steady-state load conditions.
In our simulation, the attacker misleads AGC 1 by decreasing the flow measurement
from Area 1 to Area 2 by 0.03 p.u., and Area 1 to Area 3 by 0.03 p.u.. At the same
time, the attacker keeps normal measurements according to the scheduled values to AGC
in Areas 2 and 3 in order to prevent corrective action. In this scenario Area 1 increase the
generated power in the tie-line causing the frequency goes above the upper safety limit for
all areas causing a remedial action to be triggered.
For the stealthy attacks during the first shaded area, pulse, constant, and random
signal have been initiated at k1p = 40, k
1
c = 80, and k
1
k = 150 respectively. The pulse attack
with a = −0.03 lasts for 3.6 seconds (k2p = 75). The constant with a = −0.03, last for 6.6
seconds (k2c = 145). The random attacks with µ = −0.03, and σ = 0.01 last for 2.6 seconds
(k2k = 175). In the second shaded area, the ramp attack with a = −0.01 is launched at
20 s. As shown in Fig. 5.3, the attack will cause a remedial action as the frequency goes
beyond the safe region at 24 s, while the AGC system equipped with proposed algorithm
follows the not attacked frequency deviation. The proposed algorithm is able to detect
and identify the sensors under attack in 0.09 s (i.e., Problem 1 is solved in 0.09 s). The
proposed algorithm is able to detect the attack on tie-line sensors of size 0.01 p.u. (i.e.,
a = 0.01) once the attack launched , while for frequency sensors the size is 0.1 Hz (i.e.,
a = 0.1). Smaller sizes can be detected after 0.3 to 0.5 second.
The proposed algorithm was also tested on a system with twenty states (i.e., eighteen-
area AGC system), and is able to detect and identify the sensors under attack in 0.51s (i.e.,
Problem 1 is solved using MOSEK in 0.51s). However, since most existing multi-area AGC
systems are based on three or two areas, we prefer to demonstrate the above explained
example. We believe that the supercomputer of the power system operator (PSO) can
solve Problem 1 in much faster time.
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Figure 5.3: Area 1 frequency deviation where the system is under stealthy attack (first
shaded region) and under severe attack (second shaded region)
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5.8 Conclusion
This chapter developed an efficient algorithm for detecting, identifying and mitigating
cyber-physical attacks for single and multi-area AGC systems. The proposed algorithm
develop a MILP-based state estimation procedure considering uncertainty. We provide
s-sparse observability analysis for AGC in single area and multi-area power networks.
We derived a key formula to compute the number of sensors needed versus the number
of attacks that can be tolerated. We propose a mitigation procedure based on simple
switching algorithm. Our analysis and algorithms are validated by simulations for AGC
in single and three-area power network. The proposed algorithm is capable of providing
an accurate detection of attacks and identification of the sensors under attack even in the
case of sudden load change or high load fluctuation.
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Chapter 6
Synopsis and Future Research
6.1 Synopsis
The classic Kalman filter provides the optimal estimate of the state in the minimum mean-
squared error sense. This optimal estimate is only obtained for linear Gaussian dynamic
systems. However, real-world systems in general are nonlinear, non-Gaussian or both. In
this context, finding a closed-form solution for the state estimate is very difficult, and
therefore some approximations must be made. An intensive research has been carried out
to find an approximate, yet more accurate nonlinear filtering solution since the original
formulation of the Kalman filter in 1960. In this thesis, we introduced one nonlinear filter,
which is the SCKF, and two nonlinear non-Gaussian filters, which are CPF and SCPF,
to the area of the distribution system state estimation. First, the three proposed filters
were applied to estimate the distribution system states utilizing on-line measurements.
The sampling rate T was assumed to be equal to 5 sec. A hypothesis load profile was
generated, simulating the effect of the DGs to be used as pseudo-measurements. Following,
a comprehensive comparison between the proposed algorithms and the latest methods in
the literature was provided. Second, we proposed a pseudo measurement generator based
wavelet RNN to allow the operator to forecast the status of the distribution system in
different time horizons. The proposed PG was integrated with one of the proposed SE to
estimate the states of the distribution system in a much longer time horizon (1 hour in 5 min
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interval). The proposed SE when used with the proposed PG is based on 5 min sampling
rate, which facilitates the monitoring and planing activities to be carried out. Finally,
we proposed a cyber attack detection algorithm based state estimator. The proposed
algorithm was applied to the AGC system in a single area and a multi area. The proposed
algorithm can also identify the sensors under attack. We proposed a simple switching
algorithm that enables the controller to make the proper decision. We provide an S sparse
observability analysis to the AGC in a single area and a multi area.
In summery the contributions of this thesis can be stated as follows,
• Introducing new SEs that can handle the challenges of future distribution grids with
higher accuracy.
• Providing a comparison study between the most common state estimation algorithms
used to estimate the distribution system states.
• Introducing a wavelet recurrent neural network (WRNN) to model the load at each
bus in the distribution system
• Developing a new attack resilient scheme for single and multi-area AGC systems.
6.2 Directions for Future Work
There is much room for further work on problems related to the three problem solved in this
thesis. The proposed SE for operational purposes may provide a basis for contributions.
A number of interesting problems to be treated in the years ahead include:
1. Design a VSTLF based real data that provides a load change in 5 sec or less horizon.
2. Build a operational situation assessment algorithm utilizing the data obtained by the
proposed SE.
The proposed SE for planing purposes may provide a basis for contributions. A number
of interesting problems to be treated in the years ahead include:
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1. Design a VSTLF with more sophisticated NN.
2. Build a planing situation assessment algorithm utilizing the data obtained by the
proposed SE based VSTLF.
The proposed algorithm for mitigation the Cyber-Physical Attacks in Multi-Area Auto-
matic Generation may provide a basis for contributions. A number of interesting problems
to be treated in the years ahead include:
1. Apply the proposed algorithm to more larger AGC system.
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